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NOTE 
RIDING A CART ON 
GOLF'S "UNFAIRWAYS": 
MARTIN v. PGA TOUR 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professional tennis player Jimmy Connors once asked "how 
golf could be a sport when nobody runs?"! Following the ruling 
in Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. 2 which required the Professional 
Golf Association (PGA) to make an exception to its ban on play-
ers' use of motorized golf carts during tournament play, one 
sportswriter rephrased Connors' question as "how can golf be a 
sport when nobody even walks?,,3 
Twenty-five year old Casey Martin, a professional golfer 
with an ambulatory disability, requested the use of a cart dur-
ing PGA tournament play.· The PGA denied Martin's request 
1. Jim Murray, Golfs Athletic Challenges Must be Met to Compete, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 5, 199B, at CB. 
2. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 199B). 
3. Jim Murray, Golfs Athletic Challenges Must be Met to Compete, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 5, 1998, at C8. 
4. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Or. 1998). Martin 
requested the use of a cart during the third and final round of the PGA's Qualifying 
School Tournament that would determine whether Martin would receive playing 
privileges on the following year's regular PGA Tour. See id. See also Thomas Bonk, 
Much is Riding on Wheels of Justice. L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1998, at Cl. 
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stating that, with the exception of its senior tour events, carts 
were banned from use in its tournaments. 5 
After the PGA denied his request, Martin petitioned the 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for an order allow-
ing him to use a cart.6 Casey Martin's lawsuit against the PGA 
was the fIrst suit brought by a physically disabled professional 
athlete alleging violations of the ADA. 7 Other courts had pre-
viously addressed only the rights of learning disabled, amateur 
athletes under the ADA. 8 Consequently, no precedent existed 
that applied to the facts of Martin's case.9 The court applied 
the ADA to professional sports in this case of fIrst impression, 
and ordered the PGA to allow Martin to use a cart during PGA 
tournament play. 10 
This Note begins with the background of the ADA and the 
PGA. Next, this Note provides the factual and procedural back-
ground of Martin v. Professional Golf Association Tour, Inc.,ll 
and then examines the court's analysis of the case. This Note 
includes a critique of the court's conclusion that the PGA oper-
ates its tournaments as a public accommodation and, as such, 
is not a private club exempt from ADA compliance. Finally, 
this Note concludes that the Martin court's ruling raises practi-
cal concerns for professional sports organizations. These con-
cerns arise because such organizations are now subject to 
challenges from athletes with debilitating conditions to the ex-
5. See Thomas Bonk, Much is Riding on Wheels of Justice, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
1998, at Cl. 
6. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. 1320. 
7. See Mark Conrad, After Martin Decision, The Debate &ges On, 219 N.Y .. L.J. 
5 (1998). See also Dale Gardner, Martin vs. Tour Trial Being 'Discussed', GoLFWEEK, 
Dec. 13, 1997, at 6. 
8. See Dale Gardner, Martin vs. Tour Trial Being 'Discussed', GoLl'WEEK, Dec. 
13,1997, at 6. 
9. See Mark Conrad, After Martin Decision, The Debate &ges On, 219 N.Y .. L.J. 
5 (1998). See also Dale Gardner, Martin vs. Tour Trial Being 'Discussed', GoLFWEEK, 
Dec. 13, 1997, at 6. 
10. See Thomas Bonk, Much is Riding on Wheels of Justice Jurisprudence, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1998, at Cl. 
11. 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998); 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998). 
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tent such challenges require reasonable accommodation under 
the ADA. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section provides the background to Martin's suit, be-
ginning with a general discussion of the ADA and the scope of 
the ADA. Next, this section provides an overview of the appli-
cation of the ADA to athletic programs in recent lawsuits. Fi-
nally, this background section concludes with an overview of 
the PGA organization. 
A. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
Congress introduced the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) in 1988.12 Prior to passing the ADA, Congress held 
hearings to make factual fmdings concerning the disabled 
population in the United States and to determine the extent to 
which the disabled are discriminated against as a class, by vir-
tue of a physical and/or mental disability. 13 Congress found 
12. See A&P LH Contents P.L. 101-336. Co-authored by Senator Bob Dole and 
Senator Tom Harkin, the ADA contains requirements for new construction, alterations or 
renovations to older buildings and facilities, and for improved access to existing facilities 
of private companies providing goods or services to the public. See id. See also The Cart 
Case Goes 00 Washington, Senaoors Support Martin in His &ttle with Golfs Rules, STAR-
TRIB. (MINNEAPPOUS-ST. PAUL), Jan. 29, 1998, at 2C. Martin traveled to Washington 
four days prior to his trial where both Bob Dole and Senator Harkin publicly endorsed his 
cause at a press conference called specifically for that purpose. Dole, a non-golfer, stated 
that allowing Martin the use of a cart would neither fundamentally alter the nature of 
the PGA's tournaments nor give Martin an unfair advantage. See id. 
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990). Section 12101 states: The Congress finds that--
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental 
disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is 
growing older; (2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate 
individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvemeflts, such forms of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious 
and pervasive social problem; (3) discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public 
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation,. 
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services; (4) 
unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced 
discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to 
redress such discrimination; (5) individuals with disabilities continually 
encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional 
exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and 
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make 
3
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that approximately 43,000,000 Americans had disabilities, ei-
ther physical, mental or both. 14 Congress further discovered 
that many of these individuals were discriminated against in 
the areas of employment, housing, public accommodations, 
education, recreation, transportation, communications, health 
services, and access to public services. 15 Congress found that 
discrimination against disabled persons was pervasive and 
concluded that no adequate state or federal law existed to rem-
edy such discrimination. 16 
Congress drafted the ADA to prohibit discrimination based 
on physical or mental disability in employment, and in programs 
and services provided by state and local governments. 17 The 
ADA also prohibited discrimination in the supply of goods and 
Id. 
Id. 
modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification 
standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, 
programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities; (6) census data, 
national polls, and other studies have documented that people with 
disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are 
severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally; 
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have 
been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political 
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the 
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not 
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, 
and contribute to, society; (8) the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals 
with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and (9) 
the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and 
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an 
equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is 
justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in 
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity. 
14. See id. 
15. See id. 
16. See id. 
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1990). Section 12101(b) states: 
It is the purpose of this chapter--(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards 
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure 
that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards 
established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and (4) 
to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce 
the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the 
mtijor areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities. 
4
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services by private entities within commercial facilities. 18 Con-
gress voted to enact the ADA and on July 26, 1990, President 
George Bush signed the bill into law, effective July 26, 1992.19 
1. The Scope of the ADA 
The ADA is divided into four major Titles.20 Title I of the 
ADA provides that no employer may discriminate against a 
qualified individual with a disability. 21 Acts of employer dis-
crimination include failing to hire qualified job applicants who 
are disabled and assigning otherwise qualified disabled persons 
to low income positions without opportunity for advancement. 22 
Title II prohibits all entities providing public transportation 
from excluding or discriminating against people with disabili-
ties.23 Title III prohibits discrimination against disabled people 
18. See 42 u.s.C. § 12181(6) (1990). "The term 'private entity' means any entity 
other than a public entity as defined in § 12131(1)." 1d. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) 
(1990) defines a public entity as any State or local government; any department, 
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local 
government; and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter 
authority as defined in section 502(8) of Title 45. See id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2) 
(1990). The term "commercial facilities" means facilities that are intended for 
nonresidential use and whose operations will affect commerce. See id. 
19. See A&P 136 Congo Record S9684. The bill was originally introduced to 
Congress in 1988. however, a new Congress took over in 1989 and the bill was passed 
by the House of Representatives by a 403 to 20 vote. The Senate voted 91 to 6 in favor 
of the bill. See id. 
20. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text for the scope of the ADA. 
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990). Section 12112 states: "No covered entity 
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the 
disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 1d. See also 42 U.S.C. § 
12111(8) (1990). Section 12111(8) defines a qualified individual with a disability: 
1d. 
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or 
desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to 
the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an 
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or 
interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered 
evidence of the essential functions of the job. 
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1990). Section 12112 defines the term "discriminate" 
as applied to employment practices. See id. 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12184 (1990). Section 12184 states: "No individual shall be 
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of 
5
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in public and private facilities that service the public. 24 Fi-
nally, Title IV provides telecommunications accessibility re-
quirements applicable to disabled persons. 25 
The ADA defmes a disabled person as someone who has a 
physical or mental impairment limiting one or more major life 
activities. 26 Under the ADA, a qualified individual is a person 
with a disability who can perform the essential functions of the 
job with or without reasonable accommodation. 27 A reasonable 
accommodation for a qualified individual may include altering 
existing facilities and equipment or modifying work schedules 
and duties to accommodate that person's particular di"ability.28 
specified public transportation services provided by a private entity that is primarily 
engaged in the business oftransporting people and whose operations affect commerce." 
[d. 
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1990). Section 12182 states: "No individual shall be 
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of 
public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place 
of public accommodation." [d. 
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1990). Section 12102 defines the types of auxiliary aids 
and services that can be utilized to accommodate individuals with hearing 
impairments as: interpreters or other methods of delivering aural materials, and 
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices. See id. 
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990). Section 12102(2) states: "the tel'm 'disability' 
means, with respect to an individual--(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the ml\ior life activities of such individual; (B) a 
record of such an impairment; 'or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 
[d. See also Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. at 1248 (D. Or. 1998) (citing 28 
C.F.R. § 36.104(2». According to Section 36.104(2), the phrase "major life activity" 
means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, 
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. The Martin court also cited 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) which lists the factors to be considered in determining whether an 
individual's ml\ior life activity is substantially limited, including the nature and 
severity of the impairment, the duration of the impairment, and the permanence of the 
impairment. See id. at 1248. 
[d. 
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1990). Section 12111(8) states: 
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or 
desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to 
the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an 
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or 
interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered 
evidence of the essential functions of the job. 
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1990). Section 12111(9) provides: 
6
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Entities and employers may claim that making an accom-
modation creates an undue hardship because such an accom-
modation is either too difficult to achieve or requires a signifi-
cant fmancial investment.29 Entities and employers may also 
claim that such accommodations would alter the essential func-
tions of the job.30 Additionally, entities and employers may be 
exempt from ADA compliance on the basis of their private en-
tity status.3! 
2. Application of the ADA to Athletic Programs m Recent 
Lawsuits 
Several courts have applied the ADA to high school and 
college athletic programs.32 Generally, these courts held that 
Id. 
Id. 
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include--(A) making existing 
facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals 
with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work 
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of 
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers 
or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with 
disabilities. 
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (A), (B) (1990). Section 12111(10) (A), (B) states: 
(A) In general: The term "undue hardship" means an action requiring 
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set 
forth in subparagraph (B). 
(B) Factors to be considered: In determining whether an accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered 
include--(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this 
chapter; (ii) the overall fmancial resources of the facility or facilities involved 
in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons 
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact 
otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the 
overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the 
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the 
number, type, and location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation or 
operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and 
functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, 
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to 
the covered entity. 
30. See id. 
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1990). According to Section 12187, private clubs and 
religious organizations are exempt from ADA requirements governing public 
accommodations and services. See id. 
32. See generally Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 
(6th Cir. 1995); McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 456 
(6th Cir. 1997); Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th 
7
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making the requested accommodations would fundamentally 
alter the nature of the athletic program.33 The most commonly 
challenged rules of scholastic sports programs under the ADA 
are those designating age requirements or limiting student 
athletes to a maximum of eight semesters of participation. 34 
The learning disabled students that fIled these complaints 
claimed the limitations violated the ADA because they were 
prevented from participating to the same extent as those stu-
dents without learning disabilities. 35 
In the 1995 case Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic 
Association,a6 a nineteen-year-old learning disabled high school 
senior sued the Michigan High School Athletic Association 
(MHSAA) under the ADA for refusing to allow him to partici-
pate in high school track and cross-country athletic competi-
tions on the basis of his age.37 The district court granted pre-
liminary injunctive relief and ordered the MHSAA to permit 
Sandison to run on the cross-country and track teams.38 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, 
Cir. 1994); Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass·n. 974 F. Supp. 459. 461 (D.N.J. 
1997). [d. 
33. See generally Sandison. 64 F.3d 1026; McPherson. 119 F.3d 453. 456; Pottgen. 
40 F.3d 926; Bowers. 974 F. Supp. 459. 461. 
34. See Martin. 994 F. Supp. at 1245. See generally Sandison. 64 F.3d 1026; 
McPherson. 119 F.3d 453. 456; Pottgen. 40 F.3d 926; Bowers. 974 F. Supp. 459. 461. [d. 
35. See Martin. 994 F. Supp. at 1245. See also Sandison. 64 F'.3d at 1028; 
McPherson 119 F.3d at 456; Pottgen. 40 F.3d at 928; Bowers. 974 F. Supp. at 462. The 
learning disabled students in all of these cases failed to meet age or semester 
requirements. repeated grades. and were either older than their contemporaries or 
attended high school longer than eight semesters. 
36.64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995). 
37. See id. MHSAA rules prohibited students who turned nineteen years old on or 
before September 1 of the current school year from participating in interscholastic high 
school sports. Ronald Sandison was placed in a special preschool program when he was 
four years old because he had difficulty processing speech and language. Sandison 
started kindergarten· at age six. rather than age five. and was not considered a student 
in kindergarten until he was seven years old. This two·year delay placed Sandison two 
school grades behind his age group. At age eleven. Sandison was diagnosed with 
auditory input disability. which hampered his ability to distinguish between similar 
sounds. With the help of special education support. Sandison attended Rochester 
Adams High School in regular classrooms and graduated in June 1995. Sandison ran 
on Adams's cross-country and track teams during his first three years of high school. 
MHSAA refused to allow Sandison to compete in his senior year of high school because 
he had turned nineteen years old in May 1994 just prior to commencing his senior year. 
See id. at 1028. 
38. See id. at 1028. 
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reversed the district court and held that waiver of the age limi-
tation rule would fundamentally alter the sports program be-
cause age was an essential eligibility requirement for partici-
pating in MHSAA's athletic programs.39 Additionally, the court 
of appeals found that an individual evaluation of each older 
student's abilities to determine whether they possessed an un-
fair competitive advantage was not a reasonable accommoda-
tion under the ADA. 40 
Likewise, in the 1997 case McPherson v. Michigan High 
School Athletic Association,41 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit considered whether a MSHAA rule violated the ADA by 
limiting student participation in interscholastic sports competi-
tions to athletes who had completed less than eight semesters 
of high school. 42 In McPherson, a high school student suffering 
from an undiagnosed attention deficit and seizure disorder at-
tended high school for more than eight semesters.43 The school 
prohibited the student from further participation in competi-
tive interscholastic SportS. 44 The appellate court upheld the age 
restriction limiting participation in the athletic program on the 
39. See id. at 1037. 
40. See id. See also Pottgen, 40 F.3d 926. Edward Pottgen had repeated two 
grades in elementary school due to a learning disability. By his senior year of high 
school, Pottgen had already turned nineteen years of age which made him ineligible to 
play interscholastic baseball under MSHSAA eligibility requirements. Pottgen's 
petition to the MSHSAA for a hardship exception due to his learning disabilities was 
rejected by the MSHSAA and he fIled suit claiming a violation of the ADA. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeal ruled that an individual evaluation of each athlete was 
inappropriate and that the age requirement was an essential element of the sports 
program. See id. at 927-30. 
41. 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997). 
42. See id. at 455. Representatives of the MHSAA testified regarding the 
organization's reasons for its "eight-semester rule.~ The Association stated the rule 
created fair competition by limiting the level of athletic experience and skill of the 
.. players in order to create a more level playing field for the competitors. MHSAA also 
stated the absence of such a rule would lead to players being held back academically in 
order for the student to gain greater physical and athletic maturity and ability. 
Additionally, the MHSAA maintained that the rule was essential to preserving the 
philosophy that students attend school for an education and athletics are secondary to 
that goal. See id. at 456. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
9
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basis that waiving the rule would fundamentally alter the 
sports program. 45 
In the 1997 case Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic As-
sociation (NCAA),46 the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey decided that waiving the NCAA's core 
course requirements would fundamentally alter the nature of 
its collegiate athletic programs. 47 Bowers, a college freshman 
diagnosed with a learning disability, did not meet the academic 
eligibility standard and fIled suit against the NCAA seeking to 
be declared as a "qualifier" for participation in freshman inter-
collegiate athletics and athletic scholarships. 48 The academic 
standard established by the NCAA required a student to pass 
at least thirteen high school core courses and graduate from 
high schoo1.49 Additionally, the NCAA bylaws excluded core 
courses taught below a high school's regular academic instruc-
tionallevel, including remedial and special education courses. 50 
However, a learning disabled student, like Bower, who gradu-
ated from high school and pursued college athletics, could ob-
tain a waiver of the NCAA core course requirements. 51 An ap-
plicant obtained a waiver by submitting a written statement 
from the high school principal to the NCAA indicating that the 
learning disabled student attended remedial classes but was 
expected to obtain the same knowledge as students taught at 
45. See id. MHSAA acknowledged that waivers of the "eight semester rule" had 
been granted in the past, but the attendant circumstances were narrow. Waivers were 
limited to situations in which the athlete applied for the waiver prior to the expiration 
of the eight semesters, and to cases in which students were physically unable to attend 
school for a medical reason. See id. at 456. 
46. 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997). 
47. Seeid. at 467. 
48. See id. at 461. In order to be certified as a "qualifier," NCAA bylaws provided 
that a student must graduate from high school, pass at least thirteen classes in what 
the NCAA defines as a "core course" with a minimum grade·point average that varies 
based on the strength of the student's standardized test score. Id. From the time 
Michael Bowers was in second grade, until his graduation from high school, he received 
special education and related services to accommodate a learning disability. See id. at 
462. 
49. See id. at 461. The NCAA defined a core course as a "recognized academic 
course that offers fundamental instructional components in a specified area of study." 
Id. 
50. See id. 
51. See Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 461·2. 
10
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the school's regular academic level. 52 The court reasoned that 
the NCAA bylaws provided a reasonable accommodation for 
students with learning disabilities because of the written veri-
fication waiver.53 Additionally, the court held that waiving the 
NCAA's core course requirements for ADA purposes would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the athletic program. 54 
Casey Martin's case, however, w~s different from those of 
student athletes claiming ADA violations by amateur athletic 
associations on the basis of their learning disabilities. 55 Mar-
tin's claim alleged ADA violations by the PGA because he was 
physically disabled. 56 As a result, the PGA was the first profes-
sional sports organization to defend itself against a physically 
disabled, professional athlete's claims of ADA violations. 57 
B. THE PRoFESSIONAL GoLF AsSOCIATION OF AMERICA 
The PGA, a non-profit association, is the largest sports or-
ganization in the world with over 23,000 professional golf play-
ing members. 58 It sponsors three professional golf tours: . the 
regular PGA Tour, the Senior PGA Tour, and the Nike Tour.59 
The annual prize fund for all PGA sponsored tournaments is 
presently over $40,000,000.00.60 Professional golfers partici-
pating in PGA tournaments often compete for single tournament 
prize money in excess of $1,000,000.61 The PGA Tour is consid-
52. See id. 
53. See id. at 467. 
54. See id. 
55. See Dale Gardner, Martin vs. Tour Trial Being 'Discussed', GoLFWEEK, Dec. 
13, 1997, at 6. 
56. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322 (D. Or. 1998); Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 
F. Supp. at 1248 (D. Or. 1998). 
57. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. 1320; Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242. 
58. See Mick Elliott, Golf Extra: Struggling to Bridge Gender Gap, TAMPA TRIB., 
Sept. 3, 1998, at 6. See also Leonard Shapiro, The "Other" PGA, GoLF MAGAZINE, Aug. 
1,1998, at 52. In 1916, the department store magnate, Rodman Wanamaker, hosted a 
luncheon for a group of golf professionals in the New York area. The purpose of the 
meeting was to discuss forming a national golf organization that would promote 
interest in the sport and elevate the game to a professional level. The PGA 
championship trophy still bears Wanamaker's name. See id. 
59. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321. 
60. See Thomas Bonk, Old Money, GoLF MAGAZINE, June 1, 1997, at 92. In 1997, 
the PGA's total prize money exceeded $41,400,000.00. See id. 
61. See id. 
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ered the ultimate venue for professional golfers in terms of po-
tential earnings.62 
To qualifY to play on the PGA Tour, players pay a $3,000 fee 
and submit two letters of reference to enter a qualifying school 
tournament.63 At the qualifying school tournament, successful 
players advance through three stages of elimination.64 In the 
fIrst stage, the participants play 72 holes of golf and the lowest 
scoring players advance to the next level. 65 Participants play 
another 72 holes in the second stage with the top qualifiers ad-
vancing to the third and fmal stage.66 In the fInal qualifying 
stage, the remaining golfers play 108 boles. 67 At the conclusion 
of the third stage of play, the lowest thirty-five scorers are 
awarded PGA Tour playing privileges and the next lowest scor-
ing players obtain Nike Tour playing privileges.68 If a Nike Tour 
player wins three Nike Tour events in a single season or ranks 
among the top fIfteen fInishers on the Nike Tour money list, the 
player may participate in the next season's PGA Tour events. 69 
Players may use motorized golf carts in the fust and second 
62. See Derek Lawrenson, Headed {or a Fall? European Tour Golf, GoLF 
MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 1997, at 36. In addition to the American PGA Tour, the golf 
association also sponsors the European PGA Tour which ranks second in potential 
earnings for professional golfers. See id. See also Vartan Kupelian., Watts Faces 
Crossroad, GANNETI' NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 4, 1998. Another PGA sponsored tour, the 
Japanese PGA Tour, is extremely lucrative but access by foreign players is limited to 
those golfers who obtain the Asian Order of Merit which provides players with an 
exemption to play on the Japanese PGA Tour. See id. 
63. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. See also Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248 . 
QualifYing school is the name given to the tournaments where would-be professionals 
compete for membership in the PGA ToUr and Nike Tour. The PGA Tour admits the 
most skilled golfers and the Nike Tour admits the next highest level of skilled golfers. 
See id at 1248 n.9. 
64. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321. 
65. See id.at 1321-2. Golf is scored by the minimum number of strokes taken to 
put the golf ball into the cup. The lowest scoring players advance to the next round. 
See id. 
66. See id at 1322. 
67. See id. 
68. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. 
69. See id. The PGA's qualifYing school tournament is held at the end of each 
year. Successful competitors gain the privilege of playing on the next consecutive PGA 
Tour. See id. See also, Martin Beck, Steve Kresal, Another Trip on the PGA Tour, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at D14. A money list is the PGA and Nike Tour ranking of players 
based on money earned in tournament play. See id. 
12
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stages of qualifying play, but are prohibited from using carts in 
the third and final qualifying stage.70 
Prior to Martin's case against the PGA, claims of ADA viola-
tions had been brought only against amateur athletic associa-
tions on the basis of learning, or mental disabilities. 71 Martin 
was the fIrst case to determine the applicability of the ADA to 
professional sport's organizations on the basis of an athlete's 
physical disability. 72 
III. FACTS OF MARTIN v. PGA TOUR, INC73 
Professional golfer Casey Martin was born with a disease 
known as Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome. 74 Klip-
pel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome is a congenital condition which 
curtails blood circulation. 75 This condition causes blood to pool 
in Martin's right leg, resulting in swelling, significant atrophy in 
the lower leg and bone deterioration of the tibia. 76 As Martin 
has aged, his disability has worsened. 77 The simple act of 
walking while playing golf and during normal daily activities 
causes Martin severe pain.78 Despite his pain, Martin can per-
form all the functions required during a round of golf except 
walking to and from the golf ball while it is in play. 79 
70. See id. 
71. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1245-6. See generally Sandison, 64 F.3d 1026; 
McPherson, 119 F.3d 453, 456; Pottgen, 40 F.3d 926; Bowers, 974 F. Supp. 459, 461. [d. 
See also Dale Gardner, Martin vs. Tour Trial Being 'Discussed', GoLFWEEK, Dec. 13, 
1997, at 6. 
72. See Mark Conrad, After Martin Decision, The Debate Rages On, 219 N.Y. L.J. 
5 (1998). 
73. 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998); Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 
(D. Or. 1998). 
74. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1320. 
75. See id. at 1321. 
76. See id. at 1322. See also, Thomas Bonk, Much is Riding on Wheels of Justice, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1998, at C8. 
77. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1244. 
78. See id. at 1243. 
79. See id. 
13
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When Martin was six years old, his father cut down a set of 
clubs for him and taught him how to play golf. 80 By the age of 
fourteen Martin had won seventeen Oregon Golf Association 
junior events including the Oregon State Golf Association jun-
ior title. 81 Despite his medical condition, Martin continued 
playing amateur competitive golf throughout high school, win-
ning the Oregon state championship and making the first-team 
all-state for three consecutive years.82 
Martin quickly rose to the top of national amateur golf 
rankings, fIrst earning national attention in 1991 at the United 
States Amateur Honors Course during a tie-breaking, nine-
teenth hole playoff against then number one ranked amateur 
Phil Mickelson. 83 In 1994, while earning a degree in economics, 
Martin led the Stanford University golf team to its first Pac-lO 
title in seventeen years. 84 At that time, the Pac-10 coaches 
unanimously voted to suspend the NCAA's "no cart rule" for 
Martin and allowed him to use a golf cart during tournament 
play.85 
In 1997, after two years of playing professional golf, Martin 
entered the PGA's qualifying school tournament in an attempt 
to win playing privileges on the PGA Tour.86 Martin advanced 
through the fIrst and second stages of qualifying school tour-
nament play using a cart. 87 After the PGA denied his request 
to use a cart for the third stage of the tournament, Martin 
80. See Mike Cullity, et aI., Special Report: Casey Martin vs. PGA Tour Inc., 
GoLFWEEK, Jan. 24, 1998, at 6. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. See also Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1244. 
83. See Mike Cullity, et aI., Special Report: Casey Martin vs. PGA Tour Inc., 
GoLFWEEK, Jan. 24, 1998, at 6. 
84. See id. 
85. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248. See also William Wiswall, Fairway, or Out 
of &unds?, SUN·SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale Fla.), Feb. 2, 1998, at lOCo Prior to 
Martin's participation in NCAA golf, the "no·cart rule" for the PGA, NCAA and Pac·l0 
organizations and tournaments had been the same. See id. 
86. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. See also Mike Cullity, et al., Special Report: 
Casey Martin vs. PGA Tour Inc., GoLFWEEK, Jan. 24,1998, at 6. 
87. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. 
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sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the PGA's enforcement 
ofthe "no-cart rule."88 
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Martin fIled suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon seeking an injunction compelling the PGA to 
make its tournaments accessible to individuals with disabilities, 
in compliance with the ADA 89 Martin's suit stated three claims 
for relief from the PGA's alleged violations of Titles I and III of 
the ADA.90 First, Martin alleged that the PGA denied him the 
opportunity to participate in and benefit from its tournaments 
by prohibiting him from using a cart on the Nike and PGA 
Tours.91 Second, because the PGA offered professional creden-
tials, Martin asserted that the PGA failed to make its profes-
sional development circuit accessible to him by prohibiting his 
use of a cart.92 Finally, based on his physical disability, Martin 
alleged that the PGA's prohibition on cart use during its tour-
naments constituted employment discrimination. 93 
The PGA's "no-cart rule" did not prevent Martin from, par-
ticipating in the fmal round of the PGA's qualifying school 
tournament.94 In November 1997, prior to the fmal round of 
the PGA qualifying school tournament", Judge Coffm of the 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a 
temporary injunction against the "no-cart rule. "95 The court 
ordered the PGA to accommodate Martin's physical disability 
by allowing him to use a cart in the third stage of the qualify-
ing school tournament.96 Consequently, the PGA suspended 
88. See id. 
89. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Or. 1998). 
90. See id. at 1323. 
91. See id. at 1323. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. See Martin, 984 F., Supp. at 1322. See also Jeff Barnard, Federal Ruling 
Sends PGA Tour to Trial, STATEJ. REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Jan. 27, 1998, at 23. 
95. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. See also Jeff Barnard, Federal Ruling 
Sends PGA Tour to Trial, STATEJ. REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Jan. 27, 1998, at 23. 
96. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. See also Jeff Barnard, Federal Ruling 
SendsPGA Tour to Trial, STATEJ. REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Jan. 27, 1998, at 23. 
15
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the "no-cart rule" for all players in the third and final stage of 
play. 97 
Ultimately, Martin did not qualify to play for the regular 
PGA Tour.98 However, because he placed forty-sixth, Martin 
qualified to play on the Nike Tour.99 The Nike Tour voluntarily 
granted Martin permission to use a cart in the fIrst two tour 
events in which he participated. 1°O Martin won his fIrst Nike 
Tour tournament on January 16, 1998, but failed to qualify the 
following week. 101 Martin's initial Nike Tour win, while riding 
a cart, put him only two tournament victories away from ob-
taining playing privileges on the following season's regular 
PGA Tour. 102 
The PGA fIled a motion for summary judgment with the dis-
trict court on all of Martin's allegations claiming that, as a pri-
vate entity, it was exempt from complying with the ADA. 103 
Alternatively, the PGA argued that if it was not a private club, 
Martin's use of a cart during tournament play fundamentally 
altered the nature of its golf competitions. 104 
Martin fIled a cross-motion for partial summary judgment 
requesting the court to fmd that the PGA operated a place of 
public accommodation and, therefore, was not a private entity 
97. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. See also Bill Plaschke, Verplank Can Read 
Martin the Ride Act, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at C10. 
98. See Thomas Bonk, Much is Riding on Wheels of Justice Jurisprudence, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1998, at C8. 
99. See id. 
100. See Tim Finchem, Fair Way, or Out of Bounds? Use of a Cart Would Disrupt 
Competitive &lance on the PGA Tour, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Feb. 2, 
1998, at 10C. 
101. See Thomas Bonk, Much is Riding on Wheels of Justice Jurisprudence, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1998, at C8. Martin's first Nike Tournament was played in Lakeland, 
Florida. His second Nike Tour tournament was the South Florida Classic, See id, 
102. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. 
103. See id. at 1323 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1990». Section 12187 states 
that private clubs and religious organizations are exempt from ADA requirements 
regarding public accommodations and services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1218'1. See FED. R. 
CIV. p, 56(c). Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment is appropriate where there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter oflaw. See id. 
104. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. See also note 129 and accompanying text 
for an explanation ofthe private entity exemption under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6). 
16
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exempt from ADA requirements. 105 On January 30, 1998, the 
district court denied the PGA's motion for summary judgment 
and granted Martin's cross-motion for partial summary judg-
ment, holding that the PGA was neither a private club nor ex-
empt from complying with the ADA. 106 The court deferred until 
trial judgment on the second and third claims: whether the 
Nike Tour was a course or examination and whether the PGA 
was an employer. 107 
In Fe~ruary, 1998, Judge Coffin presided over a seven day 
bench trial on the remaining claims and ruled that providing 
Martin with a cart would not fundamentally alter the PGA's golf 
competitions. 108 The court's ruling, that the use of a cart was a 
reasonable accommodation for a disabled golfer, applied only to 
Casey Martin. 109 Any future ADA claims filed by other golfers 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 110 The PGA an-
nounced shortly after the ruling that it would appeal the court's 
decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit.111 In the meantime, Martin is allowed to use a cart when 
participating in any of the PGA's golftournaments. 1l2 
105. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1320. 
106. See w. See also Martin, 994 F. Supp at 1247. The Martin court rejected 
"without detailed elaboration" the claims that the PGA was an employee and that the 
Nike Tour was a course or examination. [d. In a footnote, the Martin court 
incorporated by reference the PGA's argument against these two claims. See id. at 
1247 n.7. 
107. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327. 
108. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242. See also Jeff Barnard, Golfer Wins His Case 
for a Cart, STAR-LEDGER (Newark N.J.), Feb. 12, 1998, at 1. Judge Cotrm deliberated 
two hours before announcing his ruling. See id. 
109. See Mike Cullity, Ticket to Ride: The Casey Martin Decision, Analysis: Ruling 
sets up additional drama, GoLFWEEK , Feb. 21, 1998, at 32. The court's ruling did not 
put the PGA Tour under an obligation to accommodate any player other than Martin. 
Other players seeking a similar accommodation will have to demonstrate they possess 
an ADA-defmed disability. See w. 
110. See Mike Cullity, Ticket to Ride: The Casey Martin Decision, Analysis: Ruling 
sets up additional drama, GoLFWEEK , Feb. 21, 1998, at 32. . 
111. See Jeff Barnard, Golfer Wins His Case for a Cart, STAR-LEDGER (Newark 
N.J.), Feb. 12, 1998, at 1. See also Mike Cullity, Ticket to Ride: The Casey Martin 
Decision, Tour Not Giving Up, Appeal in Progress, GoLFWEEK, Feb. 21, 1998, at 32. An 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco could take from eighteen 
months to two years before a final decision is rendered. See id. See also Daly Done 
with Tour Events in '98, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh N.C.), Aug. 19, 1998, at C5. At 
17
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v. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Ruling on the PGA's motion for summary judgment, the 
court held the PGA was not a private club and the PGA oper-
ated places of public accommodation within the meaning of the 
Americans with, Disabilities Act (ADA). 113 With no precedent 
from the Ninth Circuit applying the ADA to athletic programs 
or professional sports organizations, the district court deter-
mined at the bench trial that allowing Martin to use a golf cart 
during tournament play was a reasonable accommodation. 114 
The court also found that Martin's use of a cart did not funda-
mentally alter the nature of a professional golf tournament. 115 
In reaching its decision at trial, the court relied heavily on its 
own prior ruling on the PGA's motion for summary judgment. 116 
A. PGA's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The district court's analysis of the PGA's motion for sum-
mary judgment determined that the PGA operated a place of 
public accommodation at the golf courses where its tournaments 
were held.117 The PGA argued that the fairways and greens 
were not areas of public accommodation during its tournaments 
because the general public could not access those areas. 118 The 
the date of this publication, the PGA had filed its appeal but the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit had not indicated when it will hear the case. See id. 
112. See Mike Cullity, Ticket to Ride: The Casey Martin Decision, Analysis: Ruling 
sets up additional drama, GoLFWEEK, Feb. 21, 1998 at 32. See also Paul Moran, Dan 
DeRosalia, Arena, NEWSDAY, Mar. 27, 1998, at A75. The United States Golf 
Association (USGA) announced that although it was not a party to Martin's lawsuit, it 
would abide by the spirit of the court's decision and provide Martin with a cart for play 
during the U.S. Open in June, 1998 if he qualified to participate. See id. See also 
Martin Rides into PGA Event, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Jul. 2, 1998, at C7. PGA 
tour card members are entitled to enter every regular PGA event. Additionally, a PGA 
tournament sponsor can extend invitations to other golfers to participate in the 
tournament. See id. See also Ron Sirak, PGA on Hot Seat Tour Must Balance 
Compassion, Competition as Martin Returns to Action, PI'IT. POST-GAZETI'E, Mar. 3, 
1998, at C7. Athletic equipment sponsors, such as Nike, Ping, and Top-Flite, provided 
Casey Martin with athletic equipment for his use. See id. 
113. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (D. Or. 1998). 
114. See Martin v. PGA Tour Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1253 (D. Or. 1998). 
115. See id. at 1253. 
116. See id. at 1244. 
117. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326. 
118. See id. 
18
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court reasoned that, although the public was not allowed inside 
the playing area at PGA tournaments, the greens and fairways 
were places of public accommodation under the ADA. 119 The 
court also determined that the PGA had not met the burden of 
showing it was a private club for purposes of the ADA and, 
therefore, was required to comply with the ADA's public ac-
commodation requirements when operating tournaments for 
membership participation. 120 
1. The PGA is a Commercial Enterprise 
The court classified the PGA as a commercial enterprise 
rather than a private club exempt from ADA guidelines, by de-
fining the PGA as an organization formed to promote and oper-
ate tournaments with the main purpose of conferring economic 
benefit on its members. 121 The court reasoned that the success 
of the PGA depended on the revenues generated by public at-
tendance at its tournaments. l22 Without paying spectators, the 
PGA Tour could not achieve its goal. l23 The court stated that 
the PGA was a commercial enterprise because it was part of the 
entertainment industry that benefits from sponsorships, gener-
ates advertising revenue and awards prize money to its mem-
bers.124 On establishing that the PGA was a commercial enter-
prise, the court then determined that the PGA was not a pri-
119. See id. 
120. See id. The PGA cited 42 U.S.C. § 12181 which provides that private clubs and 
religious organizations are exempt from providing ADA required public 
accommodations and services. The Martin court also utilized the analysis set forth in 
United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989) to determine 
whether the PGA was a private club. See id. at 1323. 
121. See id. at 1323. 
122. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. The Martin court stated the Tour's 
successful generation of revenues was in direct proportion to public participation. See 
id. 
123. See id. The Martin court stated the Tour's purpose was to promote and 
operate tournaments for the economic benefit of its members, a highly skilled group of 
professional golfers. See id. 
124. See id. The Martin court neither defined a commercial enterprise, nor cited 
any case law or statute that supported its analysis in determining the PGA was a 
commercial enterprise. See id. 
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vate entity exempt from providing public accommodations and 
services under Title III of the ADA. 125 
2. The PGA is rwt a Private Entity 
The court relied on Quijarw v. University Federal Credit Un-
ion,126 a 1980 case that did not involve ADA issues, to determine 
whether the PGA qualified as a private entity. 127 According to 
Quijano, a private entity under the Civil Rights Act is an or-
ganization that promotes some common literary, scientific or 
political objective. l28 Additionally, the Quijano court held that 
the members' common purpose must be legitimate and private 
and the entity must maintain meaningful conditions of mem-
bership.l29 In applying this defmition of a private entity to the 
PGA, the Martin court determined that the PGA's eligibility 
requirement for membership measured golfmg skill and not 
beliefs protected by freedom of association. l30 Thus, the Martin 
court rejected the PGA's argument that it was a private entity 
125. See id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1990). According to Section 12187, private 
clubs and religious organizations are exempt from ADA requirements governing public 
accommodations and services. See id. 
126. 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980). In Quijano, an employee of a federal credit union 
filed suit against her employer charging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which banned discrimination in employment and provisioning of 
services. on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. See id. 
127. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324 (citing Quijano v. University Federal Credit 
Union, 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980)). Quijano alleged that the credit union discriminated 
in its employment practices by failing to hire or promote Black, Spanish surnamed, or 
female individuals on an equal basis with White males, and by failing to compensate 
females or assign job responsibilities to females on an equal basis with males. Quijano 
also claimed that the credit union maintained segregated job classifications according to 
race, national origin, or sex. See Quijano,at 130, 131. 
128. See Quijano, 617 F.2d at 131. The Quijano court cited the definition of a 
private entity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(b)(2). These sections define a private entity as "a bona fide private membership 
club ... which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26." Id. 
129. See id. at 131. The Quijano court defmed "legitimate (as opposed to sham), 
private (as opposed to public) and must require some meaningful conditions of 
membership." Id. 
130. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. The court stated it was social, moral, 
spiritual, or philosophical beliefs that were at the core of the private club exemption. 
See id. 
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and concluded that the PGA was not exempt from complying 
with the provisions of the ADA 131 
The court further based its rejection of the PGA's private 
entity status on the holding in Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Amer-
ica. 132 The Welsh court determined that selectivity in member-
ship requires a nexus between an organization's purpose and 
its membership.l33 The Martin court surmised that generating 
revenues for PGA members was not a protectable interest that 
Congress envisioned when it excluded private clubs from cov-
erage under the ADA 134 Accordingly, the Martin court con-
cluded that the PGA's non-profit status did not confer an ex-
emption from complying with ADA requirements. 135 
3. The PGA Is Not a Bona Fide Private Club 
After concluding that the PGA was not a private entity, the 
court proceeded to apply an abbreviated, seven factor analysis 
extracted from United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club,l36 to de-
termine whether the PGA was a bona fide private club. 137 In 
Lansdowne, the government brought an action against the 
Lansdowne Swim Club alleging racial discrimination in viola-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.138 The Lansdowne court 
utilized the eight factor analysis listed in the Civil Rights Act 
to determine that the swim club was a place of public accom-
modation and not a private club exempt from complying with 
131. See id. at 1324-25. 
132. 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993). See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324. 
133. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324 (citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 
F.2d 1267, 1277 (7th Cir. 1993)). The PGA cited the Welsh definition of private club 
status. The Welsh court focused on the nexus between the purpose of the club and the 
membership. The Welsh court found the membership requirements did not deprive the 
Boy Scouts of America of its private club status when the requirements were consistent 
with the purpose of the group. The Boy Scouts of America was found to be a private club 
notwithstanding its membership total of over five million scouts. See id. at 1277. 
However, the Martin court rejected the application of Welsh to the PGA's argument. See 
Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324. 
134. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324. 
135. See id. 
136. 713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
137. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324 (citing United States v. Lansdowne 713 F. 
Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
138. See Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 185. 
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the provisions of the Civil Rights Act. 139 The eight factors util-
ized by the Lansdowne court were: the genuine selectivity in 
membership admissions, the membership control over the op-
erations of the club, the history of the organization, the non-
members' use of club facilities, the club's purpose, the club's 
advertisements for membership, the club's non-profit status, 
and the formalities observed by the club.140 Of these eight fac-
tors, the Lansdowne court considered the genuine selectivity 
factor most important. 141 The Martin court performed an analy-
sis utilizing seven of the eight Lansdowne factors and concluded 
the PGA was not a bona fide private club.142 
a. The PGA's Genuine Selectivity 
The Lansdowne court stated that the features that reflect 
the genuine selectivity of an entity are the substantiality of the 
membership fee, the numerical limit on membership, the mem-
bership's control over the selection of new members, the for-
mality of the selection process, and the standards or criteria for 
admission. 143 In determining whether membership in the PGA 
was genuinely selective, the Martin court relied on civil rights 
values central to freedom of association such as social, moral, 
spiritual, and philosophical beliefs. 144 Although the PGA con-
tended that its qualifying school tournaments ensured its 
members were chosen by an exceptionally selective process, the 
Martin court rejected this argument stating the PGA's eligibil-
ity requirements measured skill and were not designed to 
screen members on the basis of freedom of association values. 145 
139. See id. at 796-97. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. at 797. 
142. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324-26. 
143. See Lansdcwne, 713 F. Supp. at 797-802. The Lansdowne court found that 
although the swim club had substantial membership fees, placed a limit on the number 
of shareholder members, and utilized a formal admission process, it lacked genuine 
selectivity because no criteria or standard for admission existed. See id. 
144. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. See generally Quijano v. University Federal 
Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980); Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.2d 
. 1267 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969). These 
courts considered whether the club had a civic, fraternal, or social purpose. 
145. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324-25. The PGA contended that the process was 
exceptionally selective because very few golfers possess the necessary skill to become 
members. See id. 
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Additionally, the court stated that the "weeding out" process in-
herent in the PGA's qualifYing schoolinumament would always 
involve a relatively small number of applicants, and therefore, 
was not genuinely selective.146 The Martin court concluded that 
the PGA's selective process in detennining its membership was 
insufficient in confer private entity status. 147 
b. The PGA's Membership Control 
The Martin court next evaluated PGA members' control over 
the organization. 148 The court, citing United States v. Jordan,149 
rejected the PGA's contention that the voting rights of its mem-
bers were sufficient to establish its status as a private entity. 150 
In Jordan, another civil rights case, a public restaurant was 
converted into a corporation and called a "dining club" which 
remained open only to the general white public. 151 The Jordan 
court held that the restaurant did not qualify for a private club 
exemption under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the res-
taurant was converted in a corporate dining club for the sole 
146. [d. See also Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 789. The swim club had a maximum 
number of 500 shareholders, but the number of associate members varied from year to 
year. Originally, membership in the swim club was limited to Lansdowne residents. 
See id. 
147. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324·25. 
148. See id. at 1325. 
149. 302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969). 
150. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325 (citing United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 
370, 376 (E.D. La. 1969». Professional golfers who play in fifteen or more regular PGA 
Tour events in a year have voting rights for electing player directors from candidate!> 
chosen by the existing directors. New members are not nominated into the PGA, but 
instead compete to become members. The court found this type of membership control 
did little to make the PGA private. See Martin 984 F. Supp. at 1325. See also 
Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 789. Since 1979, club members annually voted whether to 
admit applicants to the swim club. Admission required a ninety percent approval of 
existing members. Prior to the vote, letters of recommendation from two active club 
members and a completed application were submitted and reviewed by the 
membership committee. The application contained the name, address, phone number, 
occupation, name of spouse,' names and birth dates of children and the names of two 
sponsors. A member of the membership committee interviewed the potential 
applicants at their homes. Prior to a vote, the only information provided to members 
were the applicant's names, addresses, names and ages of children, and the identities 
of the endorsers. At the time of submission, applicants were expected to tender the 
required fees. The swim club did not conduct any background investigation of the 
applicants. See id. 
151. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370. 
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purpose of excluding black patrons. 152 The Jordan court. con-
sidered whether the existing members had any control over the 
admission of new applicants to determine the existing mem-
bers' control over the entity.l53 The Jordan court found that a 
three-member committee controlled the dining club's member-
ship and non-committee members had no control over admis-
sions or revocations of memberships. 154 The Jordan court con-
cluded that the restaurant was not a private entity. 155 
Similarly, the Martin court found that new members of the 
PGA were not voted in by current members, but instead 
"played their way in."l56 The limited right of existing PGA 
members to vote for player directors from pre-selected candi-
dates was insufficient to show member control over new admis-
sions to the PGA 157 Thus, the Martin court determined that 
PGA member control over new membership was insufficient to 
establish this factor of the bona fide private club test. 158 
c. History of the PGA 
Next, the court examined the PGA's history as an organiza-
tion.159 The court found the PGA to be a bona fide organization 
152. See id. 
153. See id. at 375·77. In Jordan, existing members had no control over the 
admission of applicants for membership. Membership determination was made solely 
by a three person membership committee and the vote of only two of the three 
members was necessary. Members could not deny any applicant for membership, were 
not notified of pending applications for membership, and were not notified of 
membership acceptances. Existing members could not revoke memberships and were 
not given notice of pending revocations. The rules of the club provided for a hearing in 
the event of revocation, but in practice one member of the membership committee 
revoked memberships when necessary. See id. 
154. See id. at 377. 
155. See id. at 378. 
156. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
157. See id. at 1325 nA. PGA ~ember voting rights consisted of the members 
voting for player directors from a slate of candidates chosen by the existing player 
directors. Four of the nine members of the PGA policy board, are player directors. See 
id. 
158. See id. at 1325. 
159. See id. See also Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 802-03. The Lansdowne court 
looked at the history of the swim club to determine whether it had been created to 
avoid civil rights legislation. Because the club was created prior to the enactment of 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was not found to have been formed to evade 
civil rights. [d. at 802. The Lansdowne court declined to adopt the Equal Employment 
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not formed to evade the ADA because it existed prior to the ef-
fective date of the ADA 160 However, the court stated that the 
PGA's bona fide organization status alone was insufficient to 
establish that it was a private entity under the ADA 161 
d. Use ofPGA Facilities by Non-Members 
The court relied upon two civil rights cases, Smith v. 
YMCA162 and Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc./63 in analyzing the 
use of the PGA's facilities by non-members.l64 Both the Smith 
and Evans courts found that an organization's reliance on 
revenues generated by public participation subjected it to com-
pliance with the Civil Rights Act. l65 The Martin court found 
the PGA's reliance on the revenues generated by non-member 
participation, such as vendors, reporters, score keepers, volun-
teers, and members of the gallery demonstrated that non-
Opportunity Commission's Policy Statement that referred to 42 USC § 2000e for the 
definition of a bona fide private membership club as one that is tax exempt under § 501 
(c) of Title 26. See id. at 797 n.23. Instead the Lansdowne court deferred to the 
definition in Quijano v. University Federal Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 
1980) that stated for an organization to be considered exempt from coverage by Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "an association of persons for social or recreational 
purposes, or for the promotion of some common literary, scientific or political objective, 
must also be legitimate (as opposed to sham), private (as opposed to public) and must 
require some meaningful conditions of limited membership." See Quijano, 617 F. 2d at 
131. 
160. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
161. See id. The court did not elaborate on this portion of its analysis, and did not 
define a "bona fide organization" in the context of a private club analysis for ADA 
exemption purposes. See id. 
162. 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972). 
163. 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D.Va. 1966). 
164. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
165. See id. (citing Smith v. YMCA, 462 F.2d at 634, 648 (5th Cir. 1972); Evans v. 
Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966». The Smith court ruled that the 
Young Men's Christian Association was not a private club because it received a 
substantial amount of revenue from the general public. See Smith, 462 F.2d at 648. 
See Evans, 261 F. Supp. 474. The Evans court held that a golf club restaurant which 
generated revenue and was open to the general public subjected the entire golf course 
to the Civil Rights Act because it served or offered to service interstate travelers. The 
Civil Rights Act provides that an establishment that affects commerce is subject to the 
Act. See id. at 476. . 
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members utilized PGA facilities and thereby did not support its 
alleged private status. 166 
e. The PGA's Purpose 
The court briefly restated its previous determination that 
the PGA was a "commercial enterprise" when deciding whether 
the PGA's purpose supported its alleged private club status. 167 
Accordingly, the court reiterated that the PGA Tour was 
formed for the commercial purpose of promoting and operating 
tournaments for the economic benefit of its members.168 The 
Martin court concluded the PGA's activities were commercial in 
nature and the organization's purpose did not support private 
club status for the purposes of ADA exemption. 169 
f. The PGA Advertised for Members 
The Martin court relied on Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 170 
another civil rights case, to consider the PGA's advertisement 
practices for members. 171 In Wright, a black man and his wife 
fIled suit against the Salisbury Country Club alleging racial 
discrimination. 172 The Wright court held that the country club's 
advertising practices to recruit new members caused it to lose 
166. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. See also Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 803·04. 
The Lansdowne court looked at the non· members who used the swim club: guests of 
members, house guests of members, the general public attending hosted swim meets 
and parties, and the general public using the vo\1eyba\1 and basketba\1 facilities. The 
swim club also permitted the Lansdowne Boy's Club to conduct an annual public 
Christmas tree sale in its parking lot. Based on these uses by non·members, the 
Lansdowne court found the swim club's integration into the community did not support 
its claim as a private club. See id. 
167. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323, 1325. 
168. Seeid. 
169. See id. at 1325. The court stated: "The mercantile purpose of the PGA Tour 
weighs heavily against private club status." See id. 
170. 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980). 
171. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325 (citing Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 632 
F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980». 
172. See Wright, 632 F.2d 309. The couple had purchased a home in the residential 
development of Salisbury. There was no link between the housing development and 
the country club. However, the club was used in the developer's advertising for 
potential home buyers, and the club actively recruited residents of the Salisbury 
development by placing advertisements which offered reduced membership fees and 
incentives to residents. See id. 
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its private club exemption within the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.173 In contrast, the Martin court found the PGA Tour had 
no need to advertise for members because its activities and 
tournaments were extensively covered by the media. 174 There-
fore, the court concluded that the advertising factor carried 
"little weight" in determining whether a professional sports 
organization was a private entity. 175 
g. The PGA is a Non-Profit Organization 
Lastly, the Martin court recognized that the PGA was in-
deed a non-profit entity.176 However, the court again followed 
Quijano v. University Federal Credit Union. 177 The Quijano 
court ruled that credit unions exist for purely mercantile pur-
poses and members join for profit motives. 178 Additionally, the 
Quijano court determined that the tax-exempt status of a non-
profit organization was not an indication that Congress in-
tended that organization to be exempt from Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act.179 Accordingly, the Martin court ruled that 
the non-profit PGA corporation, which furthered the commer-
cial interests of its members, did not qualify as a private entity 
under the ADA 180 
The court summarized its analysis of the Lansdowne factors 
considered in determining whether the PGA was a private club 
and found that the PGA had satisfied only the history and non-
173. See Wright, 632 F .2d at 313. The Salisbury Club had no selective membership 
policy, and advertised extensively within the Salisbury subdivision for new members. 
Additionally, the club permitted the subdivision developer to advertise the club's 
existence throughout the area and to use it as an incentive for potential residence 
purchasers. See id. See also Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
174. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. The court analogized the PGA to a National 
Basketball Association team stating that because the PGA is well known, even to the 
most casual golfer, it has no need to advertise for golfers any more than the Chicago 
Bulls need to advertise for basketball players. See id. 
175. [d. 
176. See id. at 1325-26. 
177. Quijano v. University Federal Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980). See 
Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
178. See Quijano, 617 F.2d at 133. 
179. Seeid. 
180. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325-26. See also Quijano, 617 F.2d 129. See 
supra notes 305-312 for further discussion of Quijano. 
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profit status factors. 181 Satisfaction of these two factors alone, 
however, was insufficient to designate the PGA as a private 
club. 182 Therefore, the PGA was not exempt from complying 
with the ADA. I83 
4. The PGA Operates as a Public Accommodation 
The court then considered the PGA's alternative assertion 
that its tournaments did not constitute places of public accom-
modation because the golf course playing areas were not open 
to the general public during tournament play.l84 The court 
noted that golf courses were specifically included in the list of 
public accommodations contained in the ADA. 185 However, the 
PGA asserted that the playing course was a "private sphere" 
within a public place by analogizing a golf course to a major 
league baseball stadium. l86 A baseball stadium is both a pri-
vate and public place of accommodation: the bleachers in a 
baseball stadium are subject to ADA regulation because the 
public is seated there, but the dugout is not because the public 
is not admitted in the dugout. 187 In rejecting the dual use ar-
gument, the Martin court stated that a major league baseball 
team could not refuse to construct a wheelchair ramp to the 
visitor's dugout to accommodate the disabled manager of an 
opposing ball club simply because spectators are not admitted 
in the dugout. ISS The court concluded that the PGA operated 
181. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326. 
182. See id. 
183. See id. 
184. See id. at 1326. 
185. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)). Section 12181(7) provides a listing of 
entities considered public accommodations, including motion picture houses, theaters, 
concert halls, stadiums, or other places of exhibition or entertainment; auditoriums, 
convention centers, lecture halls, or other places of public gathering; museums, 
libraries, galleries, or other places of public display or collection; parks, zoos, 
amusement parks, or other places of recreation; and gymnasiums, health spas, bowling 
alleys, golf courses, or other places of exercise or recreation. See id. 
186. See id. at 1327. 
187. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327. 
188. See id. at 1327. The court quoted 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) which provides that 
"[a) gymnasium or golf course may be open only to authorized members and their 
guests, but not necessarily preclude it from being classified as a place of public 
accommodation." Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327. 
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areas of public accommodation during tournament play and, 
therefore, was not exempt from compliance under the ADA 189 
B. THE BENCH TRIAL OF MARTIN V. PGA TOUR, INC. 1OO 
One month after denying the PGA's motion for summary 
judgment, the district court conducted a seven day bench trial 
to consider the PGA's alleged ADA violations. 191 In its ruling, 
the court first determined that Martin was disabled as defmed 
by the ADA and then considered whether Martin's use of a golf 
cart was a reasonable accommodation for his disability. 192 
Judge Coff'm rejected the PGA's argument that walking was a 
requirement of playing professional golf and concluded that 
Martin's use of a golf cart did not fundamentally alter the na-
ture of the PGA's tournaments. 193 
189. See id. at 1327. 
190. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998). 
191. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242. 
192. See id. at 1244, 1248. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i-iii) (1990). The 
ADA neither requires an entity to fundamentally alter the nature of its business or 
programs to accommodate a disabled person, nor is the entity required to do so if it 
results in an undue hardship on the entity. Sections 12182(b)(2)(A) states in part: 
[DJiscrimination includes: 
(i) the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out... an 
individual with a disability ... from fully and equally enjoying any goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such 
criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered; 
(ii) a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals 
with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such 
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations; 
[d. 
(iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no 
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or 
otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of 
auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking 
such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, 
privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an 
undue burden. 
193. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1253. 
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1. Martin is Disabled 
The court first decided that Martin was disabled as defmed 
by the ADA by referencing extensive medical information re-
garding Martin's physical condition. l94 Additionally, the court 
viewed a video tape of Martin's right leg and found it to repre-
sent compelling evidence of the nature and extent of his dis-
ability. 195 Upon reviewing this evidence, the court found that 
Martin had adequately met the burden of demonstrating that 
he was disabled as defined under the ADA. 196 
2. Using a Cart is a Reasonable Accommodation 
Martin successfully illustrated that using a cart during 
tournaments would be a reasonable accommodation. 197 The 
court defmed reasonable as "reasonable in the general sense, 
that is, in the general run of cases" and applied this defmition 
to the PGA.198 The court noted that the PGA allowed carts at 
certain stages of their qualifying school tournaments, as well 
as in its Senior tournaments, and did not impose any penalties 
on players who chose to use a cart when permitted. l99 Based on 
194. See id. at 1248. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The ADA dermes a disabled 
individual as one who possesses a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities. See id. 
195. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1243-44. The court described the video. "The 
right leg appears to be about half the size of plaintiffs left leg. When pillintiff removes 
his double set of support stockings and stands upright, the leg immediately discolors 
and swells in size .... " [d. at 1244. 
196. See id. at 1248. 
197. See id. 
198. [d. (citing Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 1997». In 
Johnson, the Court of Appeal affIrmed the District Court's ruling that Johnson, a blind 
individual who sued a beer brewery owner for refusing to allow him to take the public 
brewery tour with his guide dog, was entitled to protection under the ADA. The court 
ordered the owner to make the reasonable accommodation of modifYing the brewery's 
policies to permit access by disabled persons with guide dogs. The court also held that 
the owner failed to show the modification would either fundamentally alter the nature 
of the public accommodation or jeopardize public safety. The Johnson. court defined 
reasonable as "reasonable in the general sense, that is, in the general run of cases." 
[d .. at 1059. 
199. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248. The PGA Tour permits the use of carts at 
two of its tournament stages; the Nike Tour qualifYing school tournament and Senior 
PGA Tour events. The court also noted that the NCAA and Pac 10 Athletic Conference 
also permitted the use of carts to accommodate disabled collegiate golfers. See id. See 
also William Wiswall, Fairway, or Out of Bounds?, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale 
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this analysis, the court found that Martin met his burden of 
proof showing that his request for a cart was reasonable. 2°O The 
court then addressed whether the reasonable accommodation of 
allowing Martin to use a cart would fundamentally alter the 
nature of professional golf. 201 
3. Walking Is Not a Requirement of Professional Golf 
The court stated that Martin's disability required an indi-
vidual assessment of walking as a necessity of competing in 
professional golf tournaments before determining whether the 
use of a cart fundamentally altered the nature of the game. 202 
Although the PGA argued that an individualized inquiry was 
inappropriate, the court again relied on Johnson v. Gambri-
nus203 to support its rejection of walking as a requirement of 
golf.204 The court fIrst examined the United States Golf Asso-
FIa.), Feb. 2, 1998, at 10C. Prior to 1994 the NCAA had also had a "no-cart" rule but 
suspended it when Martin played for Stanford University in 1994. See id. 
200. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248. 
201. See id. at 1249. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1990). Section 12111(9) states 
that a reasonable accommodation may include making existing facilities readily 
accessible to individuals with disabilities. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) does not require an entity to make an accommodation if the 
accommodation creates a fundamental alteration ofthe entity. See id. 
202. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. 
203. 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997). See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249·50. 
204. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249·50. The PGA relied on the various high 
school athletic association cases in which the courts had ruled that individualized 
assessment of the student was unreasonable. The PGA argued that walking is 
fundamental to the game of golf and that allowing Martin to use a cart would alter the 
nature of its competitions. Additionally, the PGA stated that as an athletic 
competition, golf requires a combination of mental and physical skills under a variety 
of conditions. The PGA contended that allowing one player to use a cart, gives that 
player an unfair advantage over those players walking the course. See id. See also Jeff 
Barnard, Witnesses &lster Martin's Case, FLA. TIMES UNION (Jacksonville), Feb. 4, 
1998, at D1. Martin's lawyers called several witnesses to testify and counter the 
argument that golf carts give players an advantage. The witnesses included Eric 
Johnson, the Nike Tour's leading money winner; Stanford University golf Coach Wally 
Goodwin who recruited Martin for his 1994 team; and Gary Klug, professor of 
physiology at the University of Oregon who specialized in the study of muscle fatigue. 
Klug's testimony asserted the physical activity required when playing golf is so low, it 
could not be considered physiologically taxing. On cross examination, Klug refused to 
concede that walking four to five miles during the course of 18 holes of golf produced 
fatigue. PGA Tour Commissioner Tim Finchem and Judy Bell, immediate past 
president of the U.S. Golf Association, testified that allowing Martin to ride a cart 
would render the playing field uneven for the other competitors. See id. 
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ciation (USGA) Official Rules of Golf and did not fmd walking a 
requirement of the golf game.205 The court then noted that the 
PGA utilized USGA rules with a modification allowing the use 
of a cart at the discretion of the PGA Tour Rules Committee. 206 
Additionally, the court discovered that in the past, when the 
PGA Tour Rules Committee had waived the "no-cart rule," it 
waived the rule for all competitors in a tournament. 207 Based 
on these findings, the court held that walking was not a re-
quirement of the game of golf. 208 
Considering extensive testimony from Martin's doctor, the 
court then determined that Martin could compete in the Nike 
Tour only if he was allowed to use a cart.209 Accordingly, the 
court then rephrased the issue before it to be whether the "no-
cart rule" may be modified to accommodate Casey Martin 
"without fundamentally altering the nature of the game being 
played at the PGA Tour's tournaments?"210 
4. Cart Use Does Not Fundamentally Alter the Nature of 
Professional Golf 
Upon determining that walking was not a requirement of 
the game of golf, the court addressed whether Martin's use of.a 
cart would fundamentally alter the PGA's golf competitions. 211 
In considering whether the use of a cart fundamentally altered 
professional golf, the court noted that the "no-cart rule" was 
205. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. 
206. See id. 
207. See id. See also Jeff Barnard, Martin Describes Pain, Cries on Stand, SAN 
DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Feb. 5,1998 at Dl. Richard Ferris, a chairman of the PGA Tour 
policy board, testified regarding the different rules for the regular PGA Tour events 
and the Senior PGA Tour events. Ferris stated that the Senior Tour was largely a 
nostalgia event and the rule difference was based on economic factors. Ferris said: "If 
Arnold Palmer has an arthritic hip and can't walk 18 holes ... he's an economic draw. 
That's why we allow them to use the carts." [d. Harry Toscano, Senior Tour player, 
testified that the Senior Tour accommodates older players like Lee Trevino and others 
who are allowed to wear plastic arm braces even though it violates the USGA Rules of 
Golf. See id. 
208. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1252. 
209. See id. at 1249-50. Martin's doctor testified that Martin had utilized several 
alternative walking aids in an attempt to alleviate his discomfort when golfing. See id. 
210. [d. at 1250. 
211. See id. at 1249. 
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designed to inject an element of fatigue into competitive golf. 212 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the fatigue created by 
walking was insignificant. 213 Consequently, the court ruled 
that Martin's use of a golf cart during PGA Tour tournament 
play would neither frustrate the purpose of the association's 
"no-cart rule" nor fundamentally alter the nature of the profes-
sional golf competition. 214 
Concluding its analysis of whether the use of a cart funda-
mentally altered the nature of professional golf, the court again 
referred to the USGA Rules of Golf.215 The court questioned 
whether certain rules could be modified to accommodate a 
blind golfer and noted that certain rules had been modified for 
the purpose of enabling a blind golfer to compete with able-
bodied players.216 Specifically, a blind golfer may possess both 
a caddie and a coach and may accept advice from either a 
playing partner, coach or caddie.217 The court found this 
authority inconsistent with the PGA's assertion that any modi-
fication of the rules of golf fundamentally alters the nature of 
212. See id. at 1250. The court recognized the PGA's position as a cognizable 
interest which was allowable under ADA standards. Had the rule been based merely 
on the tradition ofthe game, it would not be entitled to any weight. See id. 
213. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250. See also, Jeff Barnard, Venturi: Walking 
Central to Golf, Palmer, Nicklaus Also Testify on PGNs Behalf, PITI'. POST-GAZETrE, 
Feb. 6, 1998, at B3. Ken Venturi, Arnold Palmer and Jack Nicklaus testified for the 
PGA that walking is fundamental to golf as it tests athleticism and stamina. See id. 
See also and Bill Plaschke, Verplank Can Read Martin the Ride Act, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
27, 1998, at Cl. Professional golfer Scott Verplank, a diabetic, testified regarding his 
use of a cart after Martin's temporary injunction suspended the no cart rule for all 
players in the third stage of the qualifYing school tournament. Verplank rode in a cart 
and won the qualifYing school tournament by six strokes. Verplank stated that the use 
of a cart conserved his strength during the six day, 108 hole competition. At Martin's 
trial, Verplank testified regarding his use of a !=art: "I sat all day in that comfortable 
seat." [d. 
214. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1252. 
215. See id. The Martin court cited USGA rules 6-4, 8 and 8-1 to support its 
opinion that the "no-cart rule" could be modified without fundamentally altering the 
game of golf. Rule 6-4 states that a player may have only one caddie at a time. Rule 8 
defines "advice" as counselor suggestion that would influence a player in determining 
how to make a particular play. Rule 8 further defines "line of play" as the direction a 
player wishes his ball to take after a stroke which extends vertically upwards from the 
ground, but does not extend beyond the hole. Rule 8-1 regarding advice dictates a 
player may give advice only to his partner and may not accept advice from anyone 
other than his partner or caddie. See id. 
216. See id. (citing A Modification of the Rules of Golf for Golfers with Disabilities). 
217. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1252-53. 
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its competitions. 218 Therefore, the court ruled that Martin's 
requested accommodation, the use of a cart, was reasonable in 
view of his disability and did not fundamentally alter the na-
ture of professional golf. 219 
In summary, the district court ruled on Martin's claims in a 
motion for summary judgment220 and a subsequent bench 
trial. 221 In its fIrst ruling, the court denied the PGA's motion 
for summary judgment and rejected the PGA's argument that 
it was exempt from compliance with the ADA because it was a 
private, non-profIt organization.222 In the second ruling, the 
court found that Martin's use of a cart was a reasonable ac-
commodation, which neither fundamentally altered the nature 
of golf nor resulted in undue hardship to the PGA 223 Although 
the PGA announced its intention to appeal the court's deci-
sions, the PGA allowed Martin to use a cart during PGA tour-
nament play until the Ninth Circuit renders a decision.. 224 
VI. CRITIQUE 
Having no binding precedent from the Ninth Circuit to fol-
low, the Martin court relied heavily on civil rights and ADA 
cases decided in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. 225 The Martin 
court employed the analysis set forth in Lansdowne to deter-
218. See id. at 1253. In rejecting the PGA's argument that an assessment of 
Martin's disability was unreasonable, the court found that in the case of a blind golfer, 
the PGA must first recognize that the player was blind. Upon that recognition, the 
PGA must then consider whether the use of a coach gave the blind golfer a competitive 
advantage over other golfers. See id. 
219. See id. 
220. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. 1320. 
221. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242. 
222. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. 1320. 
223. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242. 
224. See infra note 112 and accompanying text for information on sponsorship 
exemptions to PGA tournaments. See also Peter Farrell, PGA Tour Begins Martin 
Appeal, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 24, 1998, at D02. 
225. See Martin v. PGA Tour Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1324 n.3 (D.Or. 1998). In a 
footnote of the opinion, the court stated: "[allthough the Welsh case involved the Civil 
Rights Act, the ADA and the Civil Rights Act are interrelated in terms and 
application." [d. However, the court provides no citations indicating the genesis of this 
conclusion. See id. See also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 
1993); Quijano v. University Federal Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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mine whether the PGA was a private club.226 However, Judge 
Coffin misapplied certain factors of that analysis and ignored 
the weight of others.227 Further, the Martin court erroneously 
relied on Fifth and Sixth Circuit case law in determining 
whether Martin's use of a cart was a reasonable accommoda-
tion.228 Lastly, the PGArules provide a reasonable accommoda-
tion for physically disabled players.229 Had the Martin court 
performed a complete Lansdowne analysis, and utilized 
authoritative case law, it would have found that the PGA was a 
private club and, thus, exempt from compliance with the 
ADA230 
A THE PGA IS A PRIVATE ENTITY UNDER A LANSDOWNE 
ANALYSIS 
The eight Lansdowne factors used to determine whether a 
club is private are: the genuine selectivity in membership ad-
missions; the membership control over the operations of the 
club; the history of the organization; the non-members' use of 
club facilities; the club's purpose; the club's advertisements for 
membership; the club's non-profit status; and the formalities 
observed by the club. 231 The Martin court found that the PGA 
satisfied only two of these factors. 232 A comprehensive Lans-
downe analysis, however, supports the PGA's status as a pri-
vate club.233 
226. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324. See also United States v. Lansdowne Swim 
Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 796-97 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
227. See Martin, 984 F. Supp at 1324-26. The Martin court's analysis utilized only 
seven factors and omitted the "formalities observed by the club" factor. See id. The 
Lansdowne court set forth eight factors to use in determining whether an organization 
was a private club. See Lansdowne, at 796-97. 
228. See infra notes 334-51 and accompanying text for an analysis of the case law 
relied upon by the Martin court. 
229. See infra notes 352-65 and accompanying text for an analysis of the PGA's 
rules. 
230. See supra notes 231-334 for an analysis of all eight Lansdowne factors. 
231. See Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. 796-97. 
232. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326. 
233. See Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. 797-805. 
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1. Membership in the PGA is Genuinely Selective 
The Lansdowne court considered genuine selectivity the 
most important of these factors and stated that the five fea-
tures of an entity that reflect genuine selectivity are: substan-
tiality of a membership fee; the numerical limit on member-
ship; the membership control over the selection of new mem-
bers; the formality of the club's admission procedures; and the 
standards or criteria for admission into the club.234 Of the five 
features to be considered when determining genuine selectiv-
ity, the Martin court evaluated only two: the formality of the 
PGA's selection process and the amount of control current 
members possessed over the admission of new members. 235 
Had the Martin court considered the three remaining fea-
tures of genuine selectivity, it may have found that the PGA 
was genuinely selective in its membership.236 The Martin court 
failed to consider that the PGA limits its membership through 
its substantial application fee of $3,000.00.237 Further, the PGA 
limits the number of new members it annually accepts into the 
regular PGA Tour to thirty-five.236 While PGA members do not 
vote to admit new players, the current members' golf perform-
ance serves as the standard to which new members must as-
pire.239 For example, a potential member with a plus fifteen 
handicap could not readily gain membership to the PGA if the 
234. See id. at 797. 
235. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324-25. The Martin court concluded that the 
PGA was not genuinely selective. See id. at 1325. 
236. See id. See also Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 797. The five features that 
indicate genuine selectivity are: substantiality of the membership fee, the numerical 
limit on membership, the membership's control over the selection of new members, the 
formality ofthe selection process, and standards or criteria for admission. See id. 
237. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. See also Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 798. A 
shareholder member of the swim club paid a $250.00 initial fee, $32.00 annual dues for 
up to three family members, and $14.00 for each additional family member. An 
associate member of the swim club paid $230.00 per season. In Lansdowne, the 
government stipulated that these fees were "not insignificant." Jd. 
238. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321-22. See also John Feinstein, Stay Out of This 
School, GoLFWEEK, Jan. I, 1995, at 200. In 1995, the PGA Tour qualifying school 
began in October with 800 players in regional qualifying tournaments. By the process 
of elimination, 190 players participated in the fmal qualifying school tournament. See 
id. 
239. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325 n.4. 
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average current member plays at five below par. 240 In essence, 
the excellence of current PGA members' skills controls the ad-
mission of new members to the PGA.241 Finally, the PGA main-
tains a strict standard of admission that is the same for every 
golfer: only the best scoring golfers at the qualifying school 
tournaments are eligible to join.242 Thus, the Martin court 
utilized and relied upon an abridged version of the Lansdowne 
analysis of the genuine selectivity factor. 243 Under a complete 
Lansdowne analysis, the PGA satisfies the standards of genu-
ine selectivity in membership factor.244 
2. Members Have Control Over the PGA's Operations 
The second factor of the Lansdowne analysis is the degree of 
membership control over the operations of the organization. 245 
The Martin court, however, incorrectly applied membership 
control "over new members" rather than "over operations of the 
organization" as the second Lansdowne factor.246 This factor 
should have been analyzed as one of several features under the 
genuine selectivity factor.247 The Lansdowne membership con-
trol factor the court refers to is "membership control over the 
240. See Mark Herrman, Subtracting Handicap is Par for the Course, NEWSDAY, 
Aug. 3, 1997, at B13. A handicap is the rating of amateur players based on the average 
of their scores which they record for each round of golf. The number would be used to 
gauge the number of strokes a player would either add or subtract from his score. This 
rating of a handicap is used in non-professional U.S.G.A. governed events to equalize 
the competition. See ill. See also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 515 (1975). Par is the standard score for each hole of golf or 
collection of eighteen holes in a single golf course. See ill. 
241. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321-22. See also Martin Beck, Steve Kresal, 
Another Trip on the PGA Tour, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at D14. Only the top 125 
players on the PGA's annual money earned list retain their PGA membership for the 
next year. Any players falling below the top 125 money winners return to qualifYing 
school to again compete for their PGA playing privileges. Therefore, the skills of the 
top 125 money winners set the threshold which new members must attain. See ill. 
242. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321-22. See also Phil Richards, Painful as it May 
Be, Golfer Pursues Dream, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 21, 1998, at D1. Of the 26 million 
golfers in the United States, only the top 125 PGA Tour money winners in a given year 
are fully exempt from re-qualifying for the following year's PGA Tour at the qualifying 
school tournament. See ill. 
243. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324-25. 
244. See Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. 796-805. 
245. See ill. 
246. See ill. 
247. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. See also Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 796-97. 
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operation of the establishment.'>248 The Lansdowne court found 
that shareholder members controlled the operation of the swim 
club through their election of the board of directors. 249 Thus, 
the swim club satisfied the requirement of member control over 
the operations of the establishment.250 Instead of considering 
the overall operational aspect of this factor, the Martin court 
analyzed the voting rights of PGA members only in the process 
of admitting new members. 251 The court stated that current 
members' rights to elect player directors to the PGA's policy 
board were insufficient to satisfy the standard under this factor 
of the analysis.252 However, the player directors are initially 
elected by the PGA membership and the incumbent player di-
. rectors, in turn, present a slate of candidates to the current 
members for the next year's election.253 Thus, continuity of the 
PGA membership's control over the organization is maintained 
from season to season.254 Therefore, the Martin courl ignored 
evidence illustrating that PGA members had sufficient control 
248. Lansdowne 713 F. Supp. at 796·97 (citing Durham v. Red Lake Fishing and 
Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Tex. 1987); United States v. Jordan, 302 F. 
Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969)). The Jordan court adopted the approach contained in the 
government's brief for its private club analysis. The Jordan court stated that control 
over the operations of an establishment was a factor to consider in determining 
whether a club was private. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 375-76. In Durham, the court 
cited the private club analysis as set forth in Jordan and stated that the "coreW factors 
that determine whether a club is private are genuine selectivity and the measure of 
control the members have over the operations of the establishment. See Dllrham, 666 F. 
Supp. at 960. 
249. See Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 804. 
250. See id. The Lansdowne court found the swim club met the criteria for member 
control over operations, did not advertise for members, had an appropriate purpose, and 
had formal membership procedures, but held these features were insufficient to attain 
private club status. The Lansdowne court ruled the club was not private because the 
history of the organization showed the swim club's membership procedures were not 
genuinely selective on a reasonable basis because the origins of the club suggest it was 
intended to serve as a community pool, and the club's facilities were regularly used by 
nonmembers. See id. at 800-04. 
251. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
252. See id. at n.4. Current PGA members vote for player directors from a slate of 
candidates chosen by the existing player directors. Four members of the policy board 
are player directors. See id. The Martin court summarized its analysis of membership 
control by stating that membership control of the organization does little to make it or 
keep it "private.w See id. at 1325. 
253. See id. at 1325 n.4. 
254. See id. at 1325. 
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over the organization's operations to satisfy the standard under 
the membership control factor of the analysis. 255 
3. The PGA's History Demonstrates that it is a Bona Fide 
Private Club 
The next Lansdowne factor the Martin court considered in 
determining whether the PGA was a private club was the his-
tory of the organization.256 In Lansdowne, the court specifically 
rejected the definition of a bona fide private membership club 
contained in the Civil Rights Act and instead utilized the defi-
nition adopted in Quijano v. Univ~rsity Federal Credit Union. 257 
The Quijano court stated that a bona fide private membership 
club must be for social or recreational purposes, or for the pro-
motion of some common literary, scientific or political objec-
tive.256 The club must also be legitimate (as opposed to sham), 
private (as opposed to public), and must require some meaning-
ful conditions of limited membership.259 
Examination of the PGA's origin and history shows that it 
met all four requirements of the Quijano definition for status 
as a bona fide private club.260 First, the PGA's initial constitu-
tion and bylaws written in 1916 include objectives that could be 
considered political in nature; formation of a relief fund for 
needy colleagues, and employment assistance for the unem-
ployed.261 Second, the Martin court stated that the PGA was 
not a "sham" because it was not formed to evade the ADA. 262 
Third, membership in the PGA was not unilaterally open to the 
255. See Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 796·802, 804. 
256. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
257. See Quijano v. University Federal Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 
1980). See also Lanscrowne, 713 F. Supp. at 797 n.23. 
258. See Quijano, 617 F.2d at 131·32. 
259. See id. The Quijano court derived this definition from consulting Webster's 
Dictionary. The term private club (as opposed to public) is defined as a private club or 
other establishment not in fact open to the public. See id. 
260. See id. 
261. See Leonard Shapiro, The "Other" PGA, Vol. 40, GoLF MAGAZINE, Aug. I, 
1998, at 52. The original constitution and bylaws of the PGA, established on April 10, 
1916, stated the following objectives: a relief fund for deserving down-on·their-Iuck 
colleagues, helping unemployed professionals fmd new jobs, and accomplish any other 
objective which may be determined by the association from time to time. See id. 
262. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
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public because members must successfully Compete with other 
applicants to join.263 Finally, the PGA possessed meaningful 
conditions of limited membership because the number of mem-
bers admitted annually may be no more than thirty-five, and 
those applicants are admitted only through a selective process 
of athletic competition.264 Therefore, because the PGA satisfies 
the requirements of a bona fide private club as set forth by the 
Quijano court and adopted by the Lansdowne court, the Martin 
court correctly found the PGA satisfied this factor of the analy-
sis.265 . 
4. Non-Members Do Not Use the PGA's Facilities 
The Martin court relied on Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc. 266 and 
Smith v. YMCA267 in determining that the participation of nu-
merous non-members in PGA golf tournaments weighed heav-
ily against its private club status.268 In Evans, the golf course, 
Laurel Links Inc., permitted the Laurel Golf Association, an 
independent club limited to seventy-five dues-paying members, 
to conduct tournaments on its course.269 The plaintiffs in Evans 
did not seek membership in the independent golf association, 
but instead sought the right to play on the Laurel Links com-
mercial golf course.270 Because the golf association was merely 
a customer of the golf course, the Evans court determined the 
263. See infra notes 63·70 and accompanying text for the PGA's qUlllifYing school 
tournament admission process. 
264. See infra notes 63·70 and accompanying text for the PGA's qUIlJi1Ying school 
tournament admission process. 
265. See Quijano, 617 F.2d at 129, 131-32; lAnsdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 797 n.23. 
266. 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D.Va. 1966). 
267. 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972). 
268. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325 (citing Smith v. YMCA, 462 F.2d 634 (5th 
Cir. 1972)). The Smith court found the Montgomery YMCA was open to the public, 
freely admitted almost all who applied for membership without question, enjoyed a 
substantial amount of revenue from the general public, operated a quasi-public agency, 
and was neither owned nor governed by its members. Based oQ these reasons, the 
Smith court found the YMCA failed to meet the standards required for private club 
exemption under the Civil Rights Act. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. See also 
Evans, 261 F. Supp. at 476. The Evans court found that a golf club which opened its 
lunch counter to the public and generated revenues subjected the entire golf course to 
the Civil Rights Act. See id. 
269. See Evans, 261 F. Supp. at 475. 
270. See id. at 477. 
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association did not violate the Civil Rights Act. 271 The Evans 
court ultimately dismissed the golf association as a party to the 
suit. 272 
In Martin's case, his claims were based on the PGA's refusal 
to let him use a cart in the qualifying school tournament which, 
in turn, would determine whether he would became a PGA 
member.273 Based on these facts, the Martin court's reliance on 
Evans, in which membership in a golf association was not at 
issue, and in which the golf association was ultimately dis-
missed as a party to the suit is inaccurate, was misplaced. 274 
The Martin court also relied on Smith v. YMCA in deter-
mining that the PGA was not exempt from the ADA as a pri-
vate club because non-members used PGA facilities. 275 In 
Smith, the court found that the YMCA was not exempt from 
the Civil Rights Act under the private club exception because it 
was open to the public, freely admitted almost all who applied 
for membership, enjoyed substantial revenue from the general 
public, operated as a quasi-public agency, and was neither 
owned nor governed by its members.276 
271. See id. 
272. See id. 
273. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. Martin's claim that the PGA Tour violated 
ADA arose during his attempt to gain membership to the PGA via the Tour's qualifying 
school toumment. See id. 
274. See id. at 1325 (citing Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D.Va. 
1966». 
275. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
276. See Smith, 462 F.2d at 648. In Smith, the YMCA had entered into a 
cooperative agreement with the City of Montgomery to operate their programs in 
coordination with the city's Park and Recreation Department. The Smith court found 
that this agreement transferred some of the authority of the City of Montgomery to the 
YMCA. This transfer of authority resulted in the YMCA serving as a municipal, rather 
than private agency. See id. Therefore, the lower court had determined: "the YMCA, 
in its discriminatory actions, had acted as a quasi.public agency and under "color of 
law." [d. at 641. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 265·66 (6th ed. 1990). "Color of 
Law" refers to "the appearance or semblance, without the substance of legal right. 
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because 
wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state ... " [d. 
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Unlike the YMCA in Smith, the PGA does not freely admit 
all who apply for membership. 277 Instead, the PGA employs a 
strict application process through its qualifying school tourna-
ment which allows only the best thirty-five applicants to be-
come PGA members, and the next seventy best players to ob-
tain Nike Tour playing privileges each year. 278 Additionally, 
the facts did not indicate that the PGA operated a quasi-public 
agency in holding its golf tournaments.279 Finally, the voting 
process by which PGA members elect player directors indicated 
a sufficient degree of membership control over the organiza-
tion's operations. 280 
In applying the Smith court's definitions of a private club to 
the PGA, the Martin court should have found that the PGA's 
facilities were not used by non-members. 281 The PGA did not 
freely admit all who applied for membership, did not operate a 
quasi-public agency, and was, to a sufficient degree, governed 
by its members. 282 Therefore, the Martin court should have 
found that non-members did not utilize PGA facilities. 283 
5. The PGA's Purpose as a Club 
In determining that the PGA's commercial purpose weighed 
heavily against its private status, the Martin court noted that 
public participation and the resulting revenues were necessary 
to achieve the PGA's purpose.284 However, the court failed to 
recognize an analogy to the long standing tradition of the pri-
vate status of religious organizations based on their non-profit 
form of organization.285 Religious organizations have system-
277. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321-22. 
278. See id. 
279. See id. at 1325. See also Smith, 462 F.2d at 641. 
280. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325 n.4. 
281. See Smith, 462 F.2d at 648. 
282. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
283. See Smith, 462 F.2d at 648. 
284. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323, 1325. 
285. See id. at 1321. The Martin court states the PGA is a non-profit association of 
professional golfers. See id. See also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). To qualifY for federal nonprofit 
tax exemptions, an organization must operate a nonprofit corporation for charitable, 
religious, literary, educational or scientific purposes. This federal tax exemption 
relieves the organization from having to pay federal corporate income taxes, allows it to 
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atic tithing and donative programs.286 Additionally, religious 
organizations routinely establish charitable programs for 
which they actively campaign for monetary donations from out-
side the congregation. 287 In turn, these donations are invested 
for the purpose of generating additional revenues to support 
various philanthropic enterprises.288 Frequently, the charitable 
programs established by a religious group are utilized by mem-
bers of the congregation, as well as the general public. 289 With-
out the fmancial contributions of participating members as well 
as donations from the general public, these religious organiza-
tions and their assistance programs could not exist. 290 
The Martin court's declaration of the PGA's commercial 
purpose is inadequate to support a fmding that the PGA fails 
the organizational purpose factor of the Lansdowne analysis. 291 
Similar to a religious charity's reliance on donations from the 
public, the PGA's purpose of promoting and educating the gen-
apply for exemption from other state taxes (such as excise, sales, franchise, etc.) and 
usually makes it eligible for a state income tax exemption. It also enables people who 
donate money to the organization to deduct their contributions on their federal (and, 
usually, their state) income tax returns. See id. 
286. See Leith Anderson, Clocking Out: Women are Choosing to Leave the Work 
Force in Increasing Numbers, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sep. 12, 1994, at 30. A tithe is 
one-tenth of a member's annual income paid in support of a church. See id. 
287. See Rachel Weissman, Who'll Pay for the Christmas Goose?, AM. 
DEMOGRAPHICS, Dec. I, 1998, at 46. Of the $143.46 billion that was donated to charity 
in 1998, religious charities that operate in the United States garnered forty-seven 
percent of the total donations. See id. 
288. See World Council of Churches and Eastern European Churches Cold-War 
&cord Upheld, THE CHRISITIAN CENTURY, Dec. 3,1997, at 1117. In 1996, Americans 
donated over $25.9 billion to the nation's 400 largest charities. To be included in this 
list, a charity organization must have raised at least $17.1 million in donations. The 
charities that reached this threshold are: Catholic Charities, Young Men's Christian 
Association, The Christian Appalachian Project, The Salvation Army (raised over $1 
billion) and The American Red Cross. See id. See also Uzi Rebhun, Geographic 
Mobility and &ligioethnic Identification: Three Jewish Communities in the United 
States, Vol. 34, Num. 4, J. FOR THE SCI. STUDY RELIGION, Dec. I, 1995, at 485. 
According to this study, seventy-four percent of the people living in the groups polled 
contribute to Jewish charities. See id. 
289. See Don Lattin, Lynda Glenhill, A Look at &ligious Charities' Missions in San 
Francisco, S.F. CHRON, Sep. 15, 1998, at A9 (provides a comprehensive listing of 
religious charities and the various services they provide to the community regardless of 
religious affiliation). 
290. See Rachel Weissman, Who'll Pay for the Christmas Goose?, AM. 
DEMOGRAPHICS, Dec. I, 1998, at 46. 
291. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323, 1325. 
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eral public about the sport of golf also depends on the public's 
willingness to contribute funds in the form of tournament ad-
mission and concession revenues.292 Although a portion of the 
revenues generated are put into the prize funds awarded to the 
top players, the remainder funds the PGA's operating expenses 
and its contributions to various charities. 293 
The PGA is equivalent to other non-profit organizations that 
solicit donations from the public and use a portion of that 
money to support the infrastructure, as well as fund charitable 
causes it chooses to SUpport.294 Although the PGA's activities 
are commercial in the abstract sense that they generate reve-
nue, its operations lack a profit motive at the organization 
level. 295 Commercial activity is not the equivalent of a commer-
cial purpose because the latter is generally limited to profit 
making endeavors.296 Therefore, the PGA satisfied the purpose 
of the organization factor of the Lansdowne analysis.297 
6. The PGA does not Advertise for Members 
In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America,298 a case relied on by 
Judge Coifm, the court specifically stated that an organization 
should not be penalized for its popularity.299 Under the Martin 
court's Lansdowne analysis, the PGA was penalized because it 
was presumed to have advertised due to the extensive media 
292. See id. at 1323. See also See Leonard Shapiro, The "Other" PGA, GoLF 
MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 1998, at 52. The PGA has built, and continues to build, golf 
learning centers staffed with PGA members that educate the public about the game of 
golf. See id. See also Timothy W. Finchem, Commissioner's Message, Professional Golf 
Association, GoLF MAG., Jan. 1, 1997, at 92. Since 1938, the PGA Tour has donated 
over $300 million to charity, more than all other major sports charitable contributions 
combined. See id. 
293. See Timothy W. Finchem, Commissioner's Message, Professional Golf 
Association, GoLF MAG., Jan. 1, 1997, at 92. 
294. See infra notes 284-97, 305-314 and accompanying text regarding the PGA's 
purpose and non-profit status. 
295. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321. 
296. See Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 804. The Lansdowne court found that the 
swim club's nonprofit organization supported its claim as a private club. See id. 
297. See id. 
298. 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993). 
299. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
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coverage it receives.300 Because the Martin court presumed 
that the PGA's extensive media coverage was the substantial 
equivalent of advertising, the court penalized the PGA for be-
ing in the public eye.301 While the PGA advertises its tourna-
ments to television audiences, the purpose of the advertising is 
to generate enthusiasm for golf and educate the public about 
PGA charity events, not to recruit membership.302 The court 
should have found that the PGA did not actively advertise for 
members and that the media coverage merely benefits its pur-
pose as a non-profit organization.3°S Under such an analysis, 
the PGA should have satisfied the relevant criteria under this 
element of the Lansdowne test.304 
7. The PGA is a Non-Profit Entity 
The Martin court stated that the PGA's non-profit status 
did not support its private entity status because it exists to fur-
ther the commercial interests of its members.305 The Martin 
court relied on definitions and analysis from the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appears case Quijano v. University Federal Credit Un-
ion. 306 However, a closer reading of Quijano indicates that the 
Martin court misapplied the Quijano analysis of whether an 
300. See id. 
301. See id. The Martin court stated: "The advertising factor carries little weight 
in the arena of professional sports." Id. 
302, See Landmarks: The Week of February 2,1998, ADVERl'. AGE, Feb. 2,1998, at 
50. The PGA spent an undisclosed "millions" of dollars on its "These Guys Are Good" 
advertising campaign. Id. See also John Kunda, Golf Tours Big Tease for Shut·Ins, 
ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Jan. 20, 1998, at C1. Tim Finchem, PGA Tour 
Commissioner, commented on the PGA's "These Guys Are Good" advertising campaign: 
"We want to capitalize on the growing enthusiasm for golf by exposing fans to the 
tremendous competitive drama of our game. At the same time, we will continue to tell 
our fans about the strong support provided to charity through the PGA Tour Events." 
Id. 
303. See John Kunda, Golf Tours Big Tease for Shut· Ins, ALLENTOWN MORNING 
CALL, Jan. 20, 1998, at C1. 
304. See Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 804. The Lansdowne court found the swim 
club's lack of advertising a countervailing consideration even though the club held a 
solicitation drive prior to the opening of the pool which effectively advertised the pool to 
the surrounding community when it first opened. See id. at nAO. 
305. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325·26. 
306. See Quijano, 617 F.2d 129. The Quijano case addressed racially discriminatory 
practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. 
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entity is private based on its non-profit status.307 In Quijano, 
the court drew an analogy between a non-profit credit union 
and an automobile club and held that these types of organiza-
tions were not private clubs because their members did not 
commingle, but merely pooled funds for common economic 
benefit.308 Based on that finding, the Quijano court stated that 
the credit union could not be a private club because it existed 
purely for commercial purposes.309 Therefore, by implication, 
the Quijano court required an element of commingling among 
the members of a non-profit organization for it to be considered 
a private club.310 
The Martin court did not consider the commingling element 
of the Quijano court's analysis when it determined that the 
commercial interests of the PGA members did not support ADA 
exempt status.311 Had the Martin court utilized both the non-
profit and commingling elements defined in the Quijano case, it 
would have found that PGA members do socially commingle 
and do not merely pool their funds for commercial economic 
benefit.312 Rather, PGA members regularly meet to participate 
in tournaments.313 Additionally, because a PGA member must 
successfully compete in order to win prize money, a member 
has no guarantee that he will receive any commercial economic 
benefit from his membership in the PGA 314 Therefore, under 
the complete analysis as stated in Quijano, the Martin court 
307. See Quijano, 617 F.2d at 132. See also Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
308. See Quijano, 617 F.2d at 132. The Quijano court stated: "It is thought that 
there must be at least some sort of commingling of members to constitute a club." Id. 
The Quijano court described commingling as associating personally with others for any 
social, civic, political, business, or any other purpose. See id. at 129. 
309. See id. at 133. 
310. See id. 
311. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325-26. 
312. See id. at 1321-23. The PGA co-sponsors professional golf events on the 
regular PGA Tour, with approximately 200 golfers, the Nike Tour with approximately 
170 golfers and the PGA Senior Tour with approximately 100 players. See id. at 132l. 
See also Leonard Shapiro, The "Other" PGA, GoLF MAGAZINE, Aug. I, 1998, at 52. The 
PGA originally began as a fraternal organization of golfers. See id. 
313. See Martin, 984 F. Supp at 1321, 1323. 
314. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. Prize money is awarded to PGA members 
that successfully compete in the golf tournaments. See id. See also Martin Beck, Steve 
Kresal, Another Trip on the PGA Tour, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at D14. Only the top 
125 players on the PGA's annual money earned list retain their PGA membership for 
the next year. See id. 
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should have found the PGA's non-profit status sufficient to 
support the ADA private club exemption. 
8. The PGA Observes Formalities in its Processes 
The Martin court neglected to analyze the fmal Lansdowne 
factor of formalities observed by a club.315 In defming the type 
of club processes that satisfy the standard under this factor, 
the Lansdowne court stated that membership cards, bylaws, 
and meetings were indicative of formal processes in support of 
private club status.316 Players qualifYing to play on the PGA 
Tour were provided with a membership card.317 The Martin 
court also referred to the PGA's rules and policy boards, as well 
as the regular meeting of players at tournament events.318 Had 
the Martin court included this factor in its analysis, it should 
have found that the PGA also satisfied the requirements of this 
element of the Lansdowne analysis to determine private club 
status.319 
Based on a comprehensive analysis of the Lansdowne crite-
ria for establishing the existence of a private club, the PGA 
satisfies each of the Lansdowne factors.320 The PGA is genu-
inely selective in its membership, a factor which the Lans-
downe court stated deserved the most consideration when de-
termining whether an entity is a private club. 321 PGA members 
315. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325-26. The court concluded its analysis of the 
Lansdowne factors with whether the PGA was non-profit organization and rejected the 
PGA's argument that it was a private club. See id. 
316. See Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 797, 804. 
317. See Bill Plaschke, Verplank Can &00 Martin the Ride Act, L.A. Times, Feb. 
27, 1998, at C8. A golfer obtaining the privilege to play on the PGA Tour is referred to 
as one who has "[picked) up his tour card.n [d. 
318. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325 n.4. See also Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248-
49, 1250, 1252-53. The court frequently referenced the various rules of golf 
promulgated by the PGA. See id. 
319. See Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 796-805. 
320. See id. 
321. See id. at 785 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e)). The Lansdowne court considered 
genuine selectivity the most important factor and stated the five features of genuine 
selectivity are: substantiality of the membership fee, the numerical limit on 
membership, the membership's control over the selection of new members, the 
formality of the selection process, and standards or criteria for admission. See id. at 
797. 
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retain control over the organization because they possess vot-
ing rights to elect player directors.322 The PGA's history shows 
that it is a bona fide club and not created to evade ADA com-
pliance.323 Although non-members of the PGA tangentially par-
ticipate in tournaments, the PGA satisfies the use of facilities 
by non-members factor of the Lansdowne analysis under the 
standard set forth in Smith v. YMCA.324 The purpose of the 
PGA is to promote and educate individuals about the sport of 
golf.325 Although the PGA awards a portion of its revenues to 
its members as prize money, those awards do not differentiate 
it in any significant manner from other non-profit charitable 
organizations.326 Although the PGA is extensively covered by 
the media, it does not advertise for members and should not be 
penalized for the popularity of its activities. 327 Finally, the 
PGA observes sufficient formalities in its processes to satisfy 
the eighth factor of a Lansdowne analysis.328 Accordingly, the 
PGA should be exempt from ADA compliance. 329 
Of the three claims that Martin alleged against the PGA, 
two were rejected by the court.330 The court rejected Martin's 
claims that the PGA was an employer and that the Nike Tour 
was a "course or examination" under the ADA 331 Instead, the 
Martin court ruled only on the issue of whether the PGA oper-
ated a public accommodation.332 Had the court foun.d the PGA 
• 322. See Martin, 984 F. Supp at 1325. 
323. See id. 
324. See id. 
325. See infra notes 305·14 and accompanying text regarding the non·profit status 
ofthePGA. ' 
326. See infra notes 305-14 and accompanying text regarding the non-profit status 
ofthePGA. 
327. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. See also Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1277. 
328. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321-22. 
329. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1990). According to section 12187 of the ADA, private 
clubs and religious organizations are exempt from ADA requirements regarding public 
accommodations and services. See id. 
330. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1247 n.7. The court incorporated by reference the 
PGA's arguments that Martin was not a PGA employee and the Tour was not a course 
or examination. See id. 
331. See id. at 1247. 
332. See id. 
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exempt from ADA compliance, Martin would have had no claim 
for relief.333 
B. THE MARTIN COURT'S CHOICE OF PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY 
The court stated that its inquiry into the facts of Martin's 
particular disability was necessary to determine whether his 
request for a· cart was reasonable.334 While the court relied on 
the ruling in Johnson v. Gambrinus335 regarding the necessity 
of a determination based on individual inquiry, it neglected 
other cases that ruled differently when applying the ADA to 
athletic programs.336 For example, in Sandison,337 the Sixth 
Circuit ruled that individual evaluation of the student seeking 
relief under the ADA would fundamentally alter the nature of 
the athletic program.338 Sandison was a nineteen-year-old stu-
dent whose learning disability caused him to fall two grades 
behind his age group. 339 Sandison was prevented from partici-
pating in high school athletics because the rules declared nine-
teen-year-olds ineligible to compete. 340 The Sandison court 
333. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1247. The Martin court rejected two of Martin's 
claims for relief: that the PGA was an employer, and the Nike Tour was a course or 
examination. The remaining claim that the PGA operated a place of public 
accommodation would not have been reached if the PGA were a private entity and 
exempt from ADA compliance. See id. at n.7. 
334. See id. at 1248. The PGA objected to the introduction of a graphic video tape 
of Martin's leg on the grounds of relevance and hearsay. The relevance objection was 
based on the PGA's concession that Martin had a disability. See id. See also FED. R. 
EVID. 401. As defined by the statute, relevant evidence is evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See 
id. See also FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted. See id. 
335. 116 F.3d 1052, (5th Cir. 1997). 
336. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248. The Martin court relied on the Johnson 
court's definition of what was reasonable. See id. See also Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1058-
59. See supra note 347 and accompanying text for the Johnson court's definition of 
reasonable. 
337. Sandison v. Missouri High School Athletic Ass'n., 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995). 
338. See id. at 1035. 
339. See id. at 1028. 
340. See id. 
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specified that an individual evaluation to determine if an un-
fair advantage existed was not a reasonable accommodation. 341 
Similarly, in McPherson,342 the Sixth Circuit found that a 
high school sports program would be fundamentally altered if 
the school waived its eligibility rule to accommodate a mentally 
disabled student.343 However, the Martin court did not follow 
Sandison or McPherson, in which individual evaluation of a 
disabled athlete were not deemed a reasonable accommoda-
tion.344 Instead, the Martin court limited its review to Johnson, 
which determined the more remotely related issue of whether 
the use of a seeing eye dog on a public tour of a beer brewery 
was permissible.345 
Judge Coff'm further cited Johnson when defming a reason-
able accommodation under the ADA. 346 Examination of John-
son, however, reveals that the court's defmition of reasonable 
accommodation in the context of the ADA was "reasonable in 
the general run of cases" when confronted with the defense of 
fundamental alteration.347 The Johnson court stated that evi-
341. See id. at 1035. 
342. McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n., 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 
1997). 
343. See id. at 462. 
344. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1026; McPherson, 119 F.3d 453. 
345. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1052, 1059. See also infra note 198 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Johnson. 
346. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248 (citing Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 
at 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997». The Martin court also cited a Ninth Circuit case, 
Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir.1996), to support its defmitions of 
reasonable and the necessity of case-by-case inquiry. However, the Crowder case 
involved the quarantine of a seeing eye dog in Hawaii. See Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1486. 
347. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059. The Johnson court outlined the plaintiff's and 
the defendant's respective burdens of proof when an accommodation is requested under 
either Title I or Title III of the ADA. The Johnson court stated: 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that a modification was re<luested and 
that the requested modification is reasonable. The plaintiff meets this burden 
by introducing evidence that the requested modification is reasonable in the 
general sense, that is, reasonable in the general run of cases. While the 
defendant may introduce evidence indicating that the plaintiff's requested 
modification is not reasonable in the run of cases, the plaintifr bears the 
ultimate burden of proof on the issue. .. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the 
defendant must make the requested modification unless the defendant pleads 
and meets its burden of proving that the requested modification would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the public accommodation. The type of 
evidence that satisfies this burden focuses on the specifics of the plaintiffs or 
defendant's circumstances and not on the general nature of the 
50
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dence focusing on specific circumstances was relevant to 
showing that the requested accommodation fundamentally al-
tered an organization, but was irrelevant to show that an ac-
commodation was reasonable.348 
The PGA argued that providing Martin with a cart would 
fundamentally alter the nature of its golf competitions. 349 Be-
cause the PGA mounted a fundamental alteration defense, the 
"general run of cases" applicable to the PGA's position were the 
Sandison and McPherson cases that stated individual evalua-
tion fundamentally alters the nature of the athletic competi-
tion.350 Had the court not mistakenly relied on Johnson for the 
purpose of determining reasonable accommodation of Martin's 
disability, the court would likely have held that the use of a 
cart was not a reasonable accommodation because it funda-
mentally altered the nature of the PGA's golf tournaments. 351 
C. PGA RULES PROVIDE A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
FOR DISABLED GoLFERS 
Finally, in the Martin court's examination of the USGA and 
PGA rules of golf, the court found no requirement for walking 
and specifically stated that the collegiate athletic associations, 
the Pac-10 and the NCAA, permitted disabled players to use 
carts. 352 However, until Martin began to play for Stanford in 
1994, the NCAA also had a "no-cart rule."353 At that time, the 
NCAA and Pac-10 coaches voted to suspend the rule to accom-
modate Martin's disability.354 What the Martin court failed to 
[d. 
accommodation ... such evidence is relevant only to a fundamental alteration 
defense and not relevant to the plaintiffs burden to show that the requested 
modification is reasonable in the run of cases. 
348. See id. at 1059-60. 
349. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1244. 
350. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035; Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930; McPherson, 119 F.3d 
at 462. 
351. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248-49. 
352. See id. at 1248. 
353. See William Wiswall, Fairway, or Out of Bounds?, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. 
Lauderdale Fla.), Feb. 2, 1998, at lOC. 
354. See id. 
51
Maitland: Americans with Disabilities Act
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
678 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 29:627 
note was that in Bowers v. NCAA,355 the college athletic organi-
zations' rules provided a reasonable accommodation for a dis-
abled player by allowing the coaches to vote on whether to sus-
pend the "no-cart rule."356 Similarly, in the Martin case, the 
PGA allowed for waiver of a rule at the discretion of the PGA 
Tour Rules Committee.357 The PGA Tour Rules Committee de-
nied Martin's request to use a cart, however, that did not mean 
the PGA lacked a method of providing reasonable accommoda-
tion to disabled golfers.358 Rather, the Rules Committee merely 
decided a course of action. 359 Therefore, instead of insisting 
upon Martin's use of a cart as the only reasonable accommoda-
tion, the court could have found that the PGA's ability to mod-
ify its rules was a sufficiently reasonable accommodation. 360 
Because the PGA Tour Rules Committee considered Martin's 
request for a waiver of the "no-cart rule," the court should have 
granted summary judgment in favor of the PGA on the issue of 
reasonable accommodation. 
Additionally, the Martin court referenced a USGA rule 
pamphlet in determining that an alteration of the PGA's rules 
would not fundamentally alter the nature of the its tourna-
ments.361 The court specifically referred to the rules applicable 
to a blind golfer.362 However, the USGA rules also provided 
355. See Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 974 F. Supp. 459, 465 
(D.N.J. 1997). In &wers, the court held that for purposes of the ADA, NCAA bylaws 
provided more than adequate reasonable accommodation for students with learning 
disabilities and complete abandonment of the "core course" requirement would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the program, and, thus, was not required. [d. See 
also infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of &wers. 
356. See William Wiswall, Fairway, or Out of Bounds?, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. 
Lauderdale Fla.), Feb. 2, 1998, at 10C. 
357. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. PGA modification of USGA Rule 6 
Transportation states: "Players shall walk at all times during a stipulated round 
unless permitted to ride by the PGA Tour Rules Committee." [d. 
358. See id. at 1244. See also Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 465. 
359. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. 
360. See &wers, 974 F. Supp. at 467. 
361. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1252-53. The court referred to a pamphlet 
published by the United States Golf Association entitled, A Modification of Rules of 
Golf for Golfers with Disabilities, which contains permissible modifications to the rules 
of golf for use by disabled golfers. See id. 
362. See id. 
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alternatives for five distinct categories of disabled golfers.363 In 
addition to blind golfers, the USGA has modified rules for am-
putee golfers, golfers requiring canes or crutches, golfers re-
quiring wheelchairs, and mentally disabled golfers. 364 Consid-
ering that at least two of these categories are more closely re-
lated to Marlin's particular disability, golfers requiring canes 
or crutches and golfers requiring wh~elchairs, the court's choice 
to draw an analogy to a blind golfer to bolster its rejection of 
the PGA's argument was unfounded.365 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
determined that the PGA was not a private club and that it 
operated a place of public accommodation during its golf tour-
naments.366 Accordingly, the PGA was not exempt from the 
ADA and had to provide reasonable accommodation to Casey 
Marlin unless such accommodation fundamentally altered the 
nature of its golf tournaments.367 
The Martin case stands for the principle that an entity must 
establish the essential functions of a task prior to any dispute if 
it hopes to mount a successful fundamental alteration de-
fense.366 This includes defining what minimum physical re-
quirements are necessary to perform a given task. 369 Next, the 
entity must establish what reasonable accommodations would 
363. THE UNITED STATES GoLF ASSOCIATION, A MODIFICATION OF RULES OF GoLF 
FOR GoLFERS WITH DISABILITIES, 1997. 
364. See id. 
365. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1252-53. The preface to the United States Golf 
Association, A Modification of Rules of Golf for Golfers with Disabilities pamphlet 
states that the publication contains permissible modifications to the rules of golf for 
use by disabled golfers. Judy Bell, former president of the USGA offered specific 
testimony that the pamphlet is intended for use by recreational golfers, not by PGA 
members. See id. 
366. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998); Martin v. PGA 
Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1253 (D. Or. 1998). 
367. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. 1320; Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1253. 
368. See Eric Matusewitch, ADA Update: Courts are Ruling on Essential Job 
Functions, ANDREWS EMPLOYMENT LITIG. REP., Mar. 10, 1998, at 3. 
369. See id. See also Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. The Martin court stated that 
nothing in the PGA's rules requires or defmes walking as a part ofthe game. See id. 
53
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be for a person with a qualified disability.370 If an essential 
function is not identified, a physically disabled individual could 
expect a reasonable accommodation.371 
The Martin court's decision sparked a well publicized con-
troversy.372 Additionally, the court's decision raises practical 
concerns for sports organizations that formerly possessed ab-
solute rulemaking authority over member participation. 373 
That authority is now subject to the judicial interpretations of 
challenges from athletes with debilitating conditions. 374 Reit-
370. See id. The court rephrased the issue as: "whether allowing plaintiff, given 
his individual circumstances, the requested modification would fundamentally alter 
PGA and Nike Tour golf competitions." [d. 
371. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1253. In finding the rules of golf did not require 
walking, the court stated; "[tlhe rules, as demonstrated, are not so sacrosanct. The 
requested accommodation of a cart is eminently reasonable in light of Casey Martin's 
disability." [d. 
372. See Daly Done with Tour Events in '98, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh NC), Aug. 
19,1998, at C5. See also Mike Cullity, Ticket to Ride: The Casey Martin Decision, Tour 
Not Giving Up, Appeal in Progress, GoLFWEEK , Feb. 21, 1998 at 32. The PGA 
announced that it would appeal the court's decision. See id. See also Jim Murray, 
Golfs Athletic Challenges Must be Met to Complete, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1998 at C1. 
This sportswriter drew an analogy between Casey Martin and a one·legged baseball 
pitcher, Monty Stratton, rhetorically asking if the rules of baseball should have been 
changed to outlaw bunting. The author then states that if bunting had been outlawed, 
a player like Maury Wills (a former player for the Los Angeles Dodger who was 
renowned for bunting) would probably never have made it to first base. The article also 
recalls that the rules of baseball were not changed for Pete Gray, a one-armed 
outfielder who played professional baseball during World War II. Had the rules been 
modified, the author supposed the rule would have been that no nmner can take 
another base while the handicapped player changed the ball from glove to throwing 
hand. See id. See also Patrick Reusse, The Casey Martin Scam, STAR-TRIB. 
(Minneappolis-St. Paul), Mar. 11, 1998, at 01C. Reusse wrote: "It was a cinch U.S. 
Magistrate Thomas Coffm would bow to political pressure and side with Martin. The 
common sense argument -- that physical limitations prevent thousands of people from 
competing in professional sports endeavors -- never had a chance after Bob Dole and 
still-serving politicians jumped on Martin's bandwagon." [d. 
373. See Thomas Heath, Judge Rules in Golfer'S Favor, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,1998, 
at AI. The Martin case raised the issue of whether courts and judges can use the ADA 
to make rules for professional sports leagues. See id. 
374. See id. PGA Tour Commissioner, Tim Finchem, criticized the judicial system 
that allowed PGA rules to be decided by a judge who did not play golf. See id. See also 
Jim Murray, Golfs Athletic Challenges Must Be Met To Compete, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 
1998, at C1. This sports editorialist asks: "suppose I yearn for a big league baseball 
career. But I couldn't hit a curve ball. Should I go to a lawyer to file suit, get an 
injunction against the pitchers throwing me a curve ball? Say it interferes with my 
right to make a living." The author continues, stating: "Congress didn't invent the 
game of golf and it has no business dictating how it should be played." ld. 
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erating that the PGA should retain sole rulemaking authority 
over its golf tournaments, Tour Commissioner Tim Finchem 
summed up the organization's philosophy for establishing equi-
table playing conditions for all participants in its events: "Play 
the course as you find it; play the ball as it lies; and, if you can't 
do either, do what's fair."375 
Patty Maitland· 
375. See Tim Finchem, Fair Way, or Out of Bounds? SUN·SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale 
Fla.), Feb. 2, 1998, at 10C. Tim Finchem quoted a three step blueprint by Richard 
Tufts in ·Principles Behind the Rules of Golf' for writing golf rules and regulations. 
See id. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, 1999; B.S. 
Telecommunications Management, Golden Gate University, 1996. This article is first 
and foremost dedicated to my mother, but I thank my significant other, Ralph Roque, 
for his unending supply of patience and golf knowledge. I would also like to thank 
Maestro Cole Harkness for his insight on accommodating physically disabled 
individuals in professional athletic competitions. Most importantly, I thank my sisters 
without whose fore"bear"ance this paper would not have been possible. 
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